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Abstract 
We examine whether earnings manipulation around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of a stock price crash post-issue and test whether the 
enactment of securities regulations attenuate the relation between SEOs and crash risk.  
Empirical evidence documents that managerial tendency to conceal bad news increases the 
likelihood of a stock price crash (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009). 
We test this hypothesis using a sample of firms from 29 EU countries that enacted the Market 
Abuse Directive (MAD).  Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that equity issuers that engage 
in earnings management experience a significant increase in crash risk post-SEO relative to 
control groups of non-issuers; this effect is stronger for equity issuers with poor information 
environments.  In addition, our findings show a significant decline in crash risk post-issue after 
the enactment of MAD that is stronger for firms that actively manage earnings.  This decline in 
post-issue crash risk is more effective in countries with high ex-ante institutional quality and 
enforcement.  These results suggest that the implementation of MAD helps to mitigate managers’ 
ability to manipulate earnings around SEOs.  
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I. Introduction 
Empirical evidence supports the theory that managerial tendency to conceal bad news 
increases the likelihood of stock price crashes (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton, Marcus, and 
Tehranian, 2009). The incidence of such crashes, or large negative returns, is positively 
associated with firm- and country-level opacity, and there is some evidence that regulation may 
attenuate the relation between opacity and crash risk (Hutton et al., 2009).  While a host of 
incentives including career concerns and compensation contracts may motivate managers to 
conceal or delay the disclosure of bad operating performance (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009), 
the incentive to conceal bad news, specifically through earnings manipulation, is particularly 
strong when a firm raises external capital.  As argued by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), 
the desire to lower the cost of external financing (e.g., through a seasoned equity offering) is an 
important motivation for earnings manipulation.   
This paper builds on the above literature and examines the relation between earnings 
manipulation around seasoned equity offerings (SEO) and future stock price crash risk using a 
broad sample of firms from 29 European Union countries.  Our study of crash risk is motivated 
by recent literature that documents the impact of extreme outcomes in stock returns on investor 
welfare (e.g. Yan (2011)).  The determinants of crash risk have received increased attention since 
the recent global financial crisis; crash risk is important to investors because unlike risks with 
symmetric volatilities, it cannot be reduced through diversification (Sunder, 2010).  While 
earnings manipulation around equity offerings and its effect on operating and stock price 
performance has been studied extensively (e.g. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), Rangan (1998), 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010)), to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to examine the 
link between earnings management around equity issues and subsequent stock price crash risk.1  
We further examine how regulation aimed at improving transparency and curtailing market 
manipulation, namely, the enactment of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD), affects the relation 
between earnings management around equity issues and crash risk.  
                                                          
1 A contemporaneous study by Boehme, Fotak, and May (2014) finds that US firms that issue seasoned equity 
experience an increase in the likelihood of a stock price crash.  They do not examine the link between earnings 
management around the SEOs and subsequent crash risk.  
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Ross (1977) argues that a firm’s decision to issue equity is based on private managerial 
information about future earnings prospects; this view suggests that managers issue equity when 
the stock price is overvalued and when they perceive lower future earnings prospects.  Empirical 
evidence on this “timing hypothesis” has been mixed (see e.g. Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007), 
Graham and Harvey (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Teoh et al. (1998), Shivakumar (2000), 
Brous, Data, and Kini (2001)).  Revealing negative information about future earnings prior to an 
SEO could significantly increase the cost of raising external capital, which may encourage 
managers to conceal such information through earnings manipulation (Dechow et al., 1996).  
Because managers’ ability to withhold bad news is limited, when the accumulated negative 
information reaches a tipping point, such information is released at once, resulting in a stock 
price crash (Jin and Myers, 2006).  This is more likely to occur subsequent to the issuance of 
equity, given the incentive to conceal such information prior to the SEO.  Building on these 
arguments, we conjecture that firms that engage in aggressive manipulation strategies to inflate 
earnings around an SEO should experience an increase in the probability of stock price crashes.  
Further, we posit that the increase in crash risk post-SEO should be stronger for firms that find it 
easier to engage in such behavior; specifically, we conjecture that firms with poor information 
environments should exhibit a higher probability of crash risk subsequent to the SEO.    
In addition to exploring the link between earnings management around SEOs and crash 
risk in an international setting, we further examine how the enactment of securities regulation 
affects firms’ ability to manage earnings around SEOs and in turn, firms’ crash risk post-SEO.  
Securities market regulators recognize the strong incentives to manipulate market price around 
securities issues and enact securities regulation to avoid practices of market abuse that 
specifically include more stringent disclosure requirements for securities issuers.  Hutton et al. 
(2009) document that the relation between earnings management and stock price crash risk 
dissipates after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  This suggests that the enactment of SOX 
decreased managers’ ability to manage earnings.  As this case shows, if securities regulations are 
adequately enforced, they should discourage earnings manipulation around SEOs, which should 
result in a decline in post-issue crash risk after the reforms are enacted.  We examine this 
hypothesis by focusing on a piece of regulation enacted across the European Union: MAD.  
Empirical evidence (Christensen et al., 2014) supports the view that MAD has been effective (i.e. 
associated with positive capital market consequences), at least in countries with strong 
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enforcement.  We focus on this directive for a couple of reasons.  First, this directive addresses 
issues that are closely related to the issuance of securities – market manipulation and insider 
trading.  Second, the same directive is implemented across our full sample of EU countries, 
which allows us to examine how cross-country differences affect the implementation of the same 
reform.  Finally, as documented in Christensen et al. (2014), MAD was implemented at different 
points in time across the EU, which helps our identification strategy, as opposed to studies of a 
single regulation or regulations implemented simultaneously.  In unreported results, we also 
explore the impact of a subsequent directive, the Transparency Directive (TPD) and find similar, 
although weaker results.  We focus on MAD because this is the first of these two important 
pieces of securities regulation to be implemented across our sample of countries. 
We test our hypotheses by employing a difference-in-differences methodology using a 
sample of 6,735 firms from 29 EU countries that enacted the MAD Directive.  Following prior 
studies (Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2001; Kim et al., 2011a, 2011b; DeFond, Hung, Li, and Li, 
2015), we measure firm-specific crash risk using two proxies: 1) NSKEW - the negative 
skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year and 2) DUVOL - down-to-up 
volatility.  DeFond et al. (2015) argue that these crash risk measures are able to capture the 
negative skewness in the volatility of the return pattern.  Our main measure of earnings 
management is total discretionary accruals.  We estimate total discretionary accruals using the 
modified Jones (1991) model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Teoh et al., 1998).   
We document several new findings.  We find a significant increase in crash risk 
following SEOs for our sample of equity issuers relative to various control groups; this effect is 
stronger for firms that engage in earnings management around SEOs; equity issuers engaging in 
earnings management are less likely to have large positive jumps in stock price; this suggests 
that our findings are not the result of fat-tailed distributions, but instead, they are a result of 
increases in tail risk.  The relation between earnings manipulation and post-issue crash risk is 
robust to controlling for well-known factors that have been shown to influence the occurrence of 
extreme negative returns (Chen, et al., 2001).  We also find that the increase in crash risk post-
SEO is concentrated in firms with a poor information environment, consistent with the view that 
managers in such firms find it easier to engage in earnings manipulation.  We further document a 
significant decline in crash risk post-issue after the enactment of the MAD directive in the EU, 
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especially for firms that actively engage in earnings manipulation.  This finding is mainly driven 
by firms in countries with strong ex-ante institutional quality.  Our evidence suggests that the 
enactment of this regulation helps to mitigate the information asymmetry problems associated 
with SEOs and to curtail the use of earnings management to inflate earnings around SEOs. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to document the link between earnings management around 
seasoned equity issues and subsequent crash risk.  We explore the link between SEOs and crash 
risk in an international setting, but more importantly, we document one important underlying 
mechanism for the increased crash risk post-issue - the extent of earnings management around 
SEOs.  In addition, we document how the enactment of securities regulation attenuates earnings 
manipulation around SEOs and subsequent crash risk for firms in countries with strong ex-ante 
institutional quality.     
Our study also contributes to the literature by exploring the link between firm-level 
opacity and crash risk (Hutton et al., 2009; Kim, Li, and Zhang, 2011a).  Hutton et al. (2009) 
find that more opaque firms are more prone to crash risk, while Kim et al. (2011a) document that 
corporate tax avoidance is positively associated with crash risk.  We expand on this literature by 
linking crash risk to another firm-initiated event, the issuance of equity, and we further 
contribute to the growing literature that links crash risk to country-level institutional quality and 
to changes in financial reporting (Jin and Myers, 2006; DeFond et al., 2015).  We expand on the 
latter studies by providing evidence on how securities regulation, through its impact on 
disclosure and transparency, can affect stock price crash risk within the context of SEOs.  
Our study also contributes to the literature on the impact of securities regulation 
(Christensen et al., 2014; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006; Zhang, 2007) by 
exploring how such regulations can affect the relation between SEOs and crash risk by reducing 
managers’ ability and incentive to engage in earnings management (i.e. hiding bad news) around 
SEOs.  Our evidence suggests that managers’ ability to hide bad news around SEOs is curtailed 
by the enactment and implementation of MAD.  Finally, we add to the literature on the effects of 
enforcement (e.g. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005), 
Jackson and Roe (2009)); our findings underscore the importance of ex-ante institutional quality 
and enforcement on the effects of securities regulation.  Consistent with Djankov et al.’s (2003) 
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enforcement theory and with the findings in Christensen et al. (2014), we document that the 
reduction in crash risk post-issue following the implementation of MAD is stronger in countries 
with better ex-ante institutional quality and enforcement.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section II we review the literature and 
develop our hypotheses.  In Section III we describe the data and methodology used to test our 
hypotheses.  In Section IV we present our main results on SEOs, earnings management, and 
crash risk.  In Section V we present results for the impact of securities regulation.  We discuss 
robustness tests in Section VI and conclude in Section VII. 
II. Hypotheses Development 
As argued by Ross (1977) a firm’s decision to issue equity is based on private managerial 
information about future earnings prospects; managers prefer to issue equity when they have 
private information about a decline in future earnings (Ross, 1977).  In addition, empirical 
evidence suggests that managers tend to withhold bad news relative to good news (Kothari, et al., 
2009), and this tendency to conceal bad news has been linked to an increase in the likelihood of 
stock price crashes (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009).  The incentive for managers to 
engage in such behavior is likely exacerbated when managers are considering issuing equity 
(Dechow et al., 1996).  Consistent with this view, several studies show that managers engage in 
earnings management in an attempt to inflate reported earnings around an SEO (Teoh et al., 
1998; Rangan, 1998).  If managers deliberately withhold bad news prior to the issuance of 
equity, the likelihood of observing a subsequent stock price crash should increase post-issue.  Jin 
and Myers (2006) argue that the amount of bad information that can be withheld by insiders is 
limited; thus, there comes a point in which all bad news come out simultaneously leading to a 
crash in the stock price.  In line with this view, using data on US stocks, Boehme et al. (2014) 
document an increase in the likelihood of a stock price crash subsequent to an SEO.   
The likelihood of a stock price crash post-issue should be higher for firms that find it 
easier to withhold bad news from the market.  As Jin and Myers (2006) document, insiders in 
more opaque firms should find it easier to withhold bad news and should experience higher crash 
risk; empirical evidence supports the positive association between firm opacity and crash risk 
(Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a).  Firms with poor information environments should also 
find it easier to hide bad news (DeFond et al., 2015; Hutton et al., 2009).  A way in which 
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managers can withhold bad news from the market is through the manipulation of earnings.  
Specifically, as has been documented in the literature (Teoh et al., 1998; Rangan, 1998, Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010), managers can engage in earnings manipulation prior to an SEO in attempts 
to inflate reported earnings.  Such behavior is likely to result in an increased likelihood of 
subsequent stock price crashes as bad news is subsequently revealed to the market.  Building on 
these ideas, we formulate our first hypotheses: 
H1a: Firms will experience an increase in crash risk subsequent to an SEO and this 
increase should be greater for firms that engage in earnings management around the SEO 
H1b: The increase in crash risk should be stronger for firms with poor information 
environments that engage in earnings management around the SEO 
Christensen et al. (2014) document positive capital market consequences associated with 
two EU directives addressing securities regulations: MAD and TPD.  The positive capital market 
effects associated with these regulations suggest that they have been effective in improving 
disclosure and reporting quality and addressing concerns about market manipulation.  We focus 
on the first of these two directives - MAD - that addresses insider trading and market 
manipulation.2  The enactment of MAD should mitigate manager insiders’ ability to withhold 
bad information and to manipulate earnings, especially around the time of an SEO.  If this is the 
case, the likelihood of stock price crashes subsequent to SEOs should be lower.  We thus 
formulate our final hypothesis: 
H2: Crash risk subsequent to an SEO should be lower after the enactment of the Market 
Abuse Directive (MAD) 
The impact of securities regulation is likely to vary across firms and its effectiveness will 
depend on the quality of its enforcement (Jackson and Roe, 2009).  Djankov et al. (2003) argue 
that the impact of regulations can vary widely across countries, and such reforms could be more 
beneficial in countries with already established mechanisms to enforce the new regulations (the 
enforcement theory).  Consistent with this view, Christensen et al. (2014) show that the capital 
market effects associated with the enactment of MAD are stronger in countries with better ex-
ante institutional quality and enforcement.  On the other hand, all else equal, firms in weaker 
                                                          
2 As mentioned earlier, the unreported results are similar (but slightly less robust) when examining TPD. 
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countries (i.e. poor rule of law) may benefit more from regulations aimed to improve the 
information environment by improving disclosure and accountability of corporate financial 
reporting.  Given these opposing views, although we do not formally develop a hypothesis, we 
also report results on how the impact of MAD is affected by firm-level as well as country 
characteristics.    
III. Data & Methodology 
We test our hypotheses using a broad sample of firms from 29 EU countries that adopted 
the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) during the period 1999 through 2012.  Our sample period 
starts in 1999 because data is unavailable for many Eastern European countries in our sample 
prior to 1999; starting in 1999 also ensures that our sample period is fairly equally distributed 
between the pre- and post-period relative to the enactment of MAD.  We obtain dates in which 
MAD came into force from Christensen et al. (2014).  Our initial sample consists of all firms 
from these countries that are covered in Thomson Financial’s WorldScope database.  We collect 
financial statement data from WorldScope and stock price data from DataStream to construct our 
main variables and controls.  Following standard procedure in the literature, we exclude firms 
from regulated industries (financials and utilities, SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 and 
between 4900 and 4949) and those with missing data on total assets or negative sales, and we 
drop firms with total assets lower than $10 million to make firms more comparable across 
countries.  To mitigate the influence of outliers we winsorize all variables at the top and bottom 
1% of the distribution.  This screening process leads to a final sample of 6,735 firms from 29 
countries, totaling 41,215 firm-year observations.   
We proceed to collect information on new equity issues from Thomson Financial’s 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC).  From SDC we collect information on the date of the issues, 
the proceeds raised from each issue and the market(s) in which the security was issued.  In 
constructing our sample of SEOs we follow Corwin (2003) and exclude initial public offerings, 
unit offers, rights, mutual conversions, and equity offerings by closed-end investment funds, real 
estate investment trusts (REITs), unit investment trusts, beneficial interests, and utilities.  In our 
analyses, we aggregate the proceeds raised in the domestic market for each firm-year (firm-
quarter-year in robustness tests). 
Table 1 shows a description of our sample firms by country and the respective dates of 
the MAD enactment in each country.  Seasoned equity issuers (1,352) represent about 20% of 
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our sample.  Most of our countries adopted MAD in 2005.  The distribution of firms varies 
widely across countries.  The U.K. has the largest number of firms (2,005) followed by France 
(898) and Germany (808), while Latvia (9) and Malta (11) have the fewest number of firms.3  
Six countries in our sample do not have equity issuers meeting our criteria.4  We include firms in 
these countries in our main regressions because such firms can serve as controls, given that those 
countries enacted MAD.  Our results are robust to the exclusion of firms from these six 
countries. 
[Insert Table 1] 
To estimate crash risk, we first estimate firm-specific weekly returns using the local 
market index and a global market index.  To account for nonsynchronous trading, we include the 
lead and lag local (world) stock market returns in each regression (Hutton, et al., 2009; Dimson, 
1979) and estimate the following model using weekly returns for each firm-year:   
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡−1𝑅𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡+1𝑅𝑚,𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑤 𝑅𝑤,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡
𝑤 𝑅𝑤,𝑡 + +𝛽𝑖,+𝑡+1
𝑤 𝑅𝑤,𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (1) 
where Ri,t is firm i’s stock return in week t; Rm,t is the local market index return in week t; Rw,t is 
the return on the world market index in week t, and i,t is firm i’s weekly firm-specific return.  
We use weekly returns in our estimations to mitigate measurement problems associated with 
infrequent trading and to avoid the issue with misleading return distributions associated with 
daily returns (see e.g. DeFond et al. (2015)).  Consistent with the literature, we use the natural 
logarithm of one plus the firm-specific return (i,t) as our measure of firm-specific returns, 
FIRMRET. 
We use two measures of crash risk, following Chen et al. (2001) and Kim et al. (2011a, 
2011b): 1) NSKEW –negative skewness– the negative of the third moment of firm-specific 
weekly returns over the fiscal year, and 2) DUVOL –down-to-up volatility– the standard 
deviation of the below-the mean weekly firms-specific returns divided by the standard deviation 
                                                          
3 Our results hold if we exclude these countries (i.e., Latvia, Malta, Estonia and Iceland) with very few firms (less 
than 15) from our analysis.  
4 The six countries that do not report any equity issuers during our sample period are Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, 
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.  Firms from these countries represent only about 2.5% of our sample. 
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of above-the mean firm-specific return in a given year.  Larger values of both measures indicate 
greater crash risk.5 
Our main measure of earnings management is total discretionary accruals.6  We estimate 
total discretionary accruals using the modified Jones (1991) model, following Dechow et al. 
(1995) and Teoh et al. (1998).  To estimate total discretionary accruals, we first estimate the 
following regression in each subgroup of firms, j,  that includes all firms in the same country and 
same two-digit SIC code as the equity issuer:  
TOTACC𝑖,𝑡 
TA𝑖,𝑡−1
 = α𝑗  
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 +  β1𝑗
∆SALES𝑖,𝑡 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β2𝑗  
PPE𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 +  ε𝑖,𝑡  (2) 
TOTACC is total accruals (earnings before extraordinary items less cash flows from operations); 
TA is total assets, ∆SALES is the change in sales in year t, and PPE is property, plant, and 
equipment.  Nondiscretionary total accruals (NDTAC) are obtained using the estimates from the 
above regressions as: 
NDTAC𝑖,𝑡 = α̂𝑗  
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 +  β̂1𝑗
∆SALES𝑖,𝑡 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+  β̂2𝑗  
PPE𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
    (3) 
We compute total discretionary accruals (DISCACC) as the difference between total 
accruals and nondiscretionary accruals.  Appendix A has detailed definition of our estimation of 
discretionary accruals. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all firm-level variables used in our analyses.  
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the average proceeds raised in an SEO represents 1% of total 
assets.  The average crash risk NSKEW (DUVOL) is -0.239 (-0.123).  In Panels B and C we 
report statistics for our sample of equity issuers and non-issuers; each year we classify firms as 
issuers if they raise equity in the prior year.  Firms that issue equity have significantly higher 
crash risk in the subsequent year; average NSKEW (DUVOL) is -0.187 (-0.099) for equity 
issuers, compared to -0.241 (-0.124) for non-issuers (these results are significant at the 1% level).  
We observe that equity issuers tend to be larger, less profitable (in terms of ROA), more 
                                                          
5 As an alternate measure of crash risk, we use an indicator variable, CRASH, that is equal to one if the firm-specific 
return, FIRMRET, is 3.2 or more standard deviations below firm i’s mean weekly firm-specific log-return during 
that year, and 0 otherwise. In unreported results, we find similar results when this alternate measure is used.  We do 
not use the indicator of crash risk in our main results because this measure does not capture the asymmetry in the 
return distribution; the left and right tail risk are computed independently (see e.g. DeFond et al. (2015)). 
6 In robustness tests, we use discretionary current accruals as our proxy for earnings management, following Teoh et 
al. (1998).  Appendix A has a detailed explanation of the estimation of current discretionary accruals.  
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leveraged, but with higher market-to-book ratios than non-issuers.  In addition, equity issuers 
have significantly higher levels of discretionary accruals. 
In Table 3 we report Pearson correlation coefficients across our main variables.  We 
observe that both measures of crash risk are positively correlated with equity issuance in the 
prior year.  Consistent with other studies (e.g. DeFond et al. (2015)) we find that crash risk is 
also positively correlated with firm size, firm-specific returns, profitability, leverage, and 
market-to-book.  We also observe a positive correlation between equity issues and firm size, 
leverage, discretionary accruals, and market-to-book ratios, but a negative correlation between 
equity issues and profitability. 
 
IV. Main Results 
a. SEOs and Crash Risk 
We first examine whether firms that issue seasoned equity experience a subsequent increase in 
crash risk, and whether the change in crash risk is associated with earnings management around 
the SEO.  To test the predictions of our first two hypotheses, we run various specifications of the 
following regressions: 
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑀 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑀 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑍𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (4) 
where Crash Riski,c,t refers to our two measures- NSKEW and DUVOL- for firm i in country c in 
year t; SEOi,t-1 is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm raised equity capital in the home 
country c in year t-1 and zero otherwise;7 HIEM refers to two indicator variables for firms with 
high levels of earnings management: High EM (Total) and High EM (Current).  High EM Total 
(Current) is an indicator variable that equals one for firms with above median total (current) 
discretionary accruals in their country in year t-2 (the year before the equity issue) and zero 
otherwise.  Xi,t-1 is a vector of controls that have been shown to affect crash risk (Chen et al. 
2001; DeFond et al., 2015, Hutton et al., 2009).  These include :1) DTURNt-1 – the change in the 
average monthly share turnover between year t-1 and t-2, which captures differences of opinion 
among investors, which can impact crash risk; 2) SIZEt-1 – the log of the book value of total 
assets, given that larger firms tend to have higher crash risk; 3) SIGMAt-1 – the standard deviation 
of weekly firm-specific return in year t-1, to control for the impact of higher volatility on crash 
                                                          
7 In robustness tests, we also use the total SEO proceeds (in US$ million) raised in the home market in year t-1, 
scaled by total assets in year t-2 and find qualitatively similar results. 
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risk; 4) FIRMRETt-1 – the average weekly firm-specific return in year t-1, to control for the 
higher likelihood of a crash for firms with higher past returns; 5) ROAt-1- earnings before 
extraordinary items divided by total assets, to control for the impact of operating performance on 
crash risk; 6) Leverage t-1 – long-term debt-divided by total assets; 7) DISCACC – the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model, as in Dechow 
et al. (1995), to control for the increased crash risk for firms with higher levels of discretionary 
accruals; 8) Market-to-Bookt-1 – the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity, 
to control for growth opportunities, and 9) lagged NSKEW (DUVOL) to control for the 
propensity of firms with higher crash risk to exhibit higher future crash risk.  Zc,t-1 is a vector of 
country level controls, which includes the log of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (Log 
GDP per capita) and the growth in real GDP (GDP growth) to control for financial development 
and growth, and Governance index, which is the average of the six governance indicators of 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009).8  All of the variables used in our analyses are described 
in Appendix A.  We include country, industry, and year fixed effects in all regressions to capture 
time-invariant country and industry characteristics that may affect crash risk, and to control for 
time effects, respectively, and we cluster standard errors at the country level allowing for the 
error term to be correlated for firms within a country.  
 We report results from estimations of Equation 4 in Table 4.  To test Hypothesis 1a, we 
first run regressions excluding the indicator variable, HIEM, and the interaction term.  We 
present results from these regressions in Panel A of Table 4.  Our variable of interest is the 
coefficient β1, which captures the change in crash risk for firms that issued equity in the prior 
year relative to firms in the same country that did not issue equity.  Per the first part of 
Hypothesis 1a, we expect this coefficient to be positive and significant if the issuance of 
seasoned equity is associated with increased crash risk.  In Models (1) through (3) we present 
results using our primary measure of crash risk, NSKEW, while Models (4) through (6) show 
results for our alternate measure, DUVOL.  In Model (1) we show results from our baseline 
specifications using country, industry, and year fixed effects.  We observe a positive and 
significant coefficient on β1, suggesting an increase in crash risk for firms that issue equity.  The 
results are both statistically and economically significant.  The coefficient in Model (1) suggests 
                                                          
8 The six indicators include: voice and accountability, regulatory quality, political stability, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption. 
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that firms that issue equity in the prior year have a 0.052 increase in crash risk in the subsequent 
year, relative to firms that did not issue equity, which represents about 5.9% of the standard 
deviation (0.879).  In Model (2) we report results using firm and year fixed effects to better 
control for time invariant firm-specific characteristics; results are similar when this alternate 
approach is used; we thus present the remaining results using our baseline specification with 
country, industry, and year fixed effects.   
Differences in firm characteristics between equity issuers and non-issuers may help 
explain why we observe higher crash risk post-SEO.  The descriptive statistics in Table 2 show, 
for example, that equity issuers tend to be much larger and less profitable than non-issuers.  
Although we control for size and profitability in our regressions, as another way to test the 
robustness of our results, in Model (3) we replicate our results using only a matched sample of 
non-equity issuers.  Specifically, we run regressions using a control group of non-equity issuers 
that are matched by propensity score (PSM).  We implement this procedure by first estimating a 
logit regression to model the probability of being an equity issuer, using all controls used in the 
second-stage regressions.  Next, we estimate the propensity score for each firm using the 
predicted probabilities from the logit model and match each issuer to a non-issuer in its country 
and industry (two-digit SIC code) using the nearest neighbor matching technique (with 
replacement).  The results in Model (3) confirm our earlier findings.  The coefficient on β1 
remains positive and statistically significant.  The magnitude of the results using the matched 
sample is similar to our earlier results.  The results in Model (3) suggest that crash risk is 0.042 
higher for firms that issue equity in the prior year, which represents 4.7% of its standard 
deviation.9   
The results in Models (4) through (6) of Panel A of Table 4 use the alternate measure of 
crash risk, DUVOL, and confirm our baseline results.  Firms that issue equity have significantly 
higher crash risk relative to those firms that do not issue equity.  The magnitude and significance 
of the results using DUVOL are similar to those using NSKEW.  For example, the coefficient in 
Model (4) indicates a 0.023 increase in DUVOL for firms issuing equity in the prior year, which 
corresponds to 5.9% of the standard deviation (0.389). 
                                                          
9 For the subsample of PSM-matched firms, the standard deviation of NSKEW is 0.902. 
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To examine the mechanism driving the increase crash risk post-issue (the second part of 
Hypothesis 1a), we next explore whether the increase in crash risk subsequent to an SEO is 
associated with the extent of earnings manipulation around the SEO.  To explore this, we 
estimate Equation 4 including the interactions with the proxies for high earnings management, 
High EM (Total) and High EM (Current), based on the level of total and current discretionary 
accruals in the year prior to the SEO, respectively.  While we expect that higher levels of 
discretionary accruals in the year prior to an SEO should be associated with higher crash risk, 
managers tend to have more discretion over current accruals (Guenther, 1994), which suggests 
that our findings should be more pronounced when using current discretionary accruals.   
We report results from the estimation of Equation 4 in Panel B of Table 4.  Our variable 
of interest is the interaction term, High EM x SEO t-1, and the corresponding coefficient β2.  
Hypothesis 1a predicts a positive and significant coefficient β2, which would suggest that issuers 
of seasoned equity with high levels of discretionary accruals in the year prior to the SEO 
experience a larger increase in crash risk in the subsequent year.  The results add support to 
Hypothesis 1a.  The coefficient β2 is positive and statistically significant across all model 
specifications.  Taking the coefficients in Model (1) as an example, the results show that equity 
issuers with below-median discretionary accruals in their country in the year prior to the SEO 
experience a 0.044 increase in crash risk in the following year.  Equity issuers with above 
median discretionary accruals experience a larger 0.062 increase in crash risk that corresponds to 
7.1% of the standard deviation.10  The magnitude of our results is larger when we use current 
discretionary accruals (Model (2)).  The results in Model (2) suggest no difference in crash risk 
between non-issuers and equity issuers with below-median discretionary accruals prior to the 
SEO (coefficient on SEO is 0.013 with a t-statistic of 0.88), but a 0.082 higher crash risk (9.3% 
of its standard deviation) for equity issuers with high levels of current discretionary accruals.  
We obtain similar results when using our alternate measure of crash risk, DUVOL.  From Model 
(3), the results show a 0.029 higher crash risk (7.5% of its standard deviation) post-issue for 
equity issuers with high levels of discretionary accruals relative to non-issuers.  
The evidence thus far suggests that managers manipulate earnings through discretionary 
accruals prior to an SEO when they have private knowledge of a decline in future earnings, 
                                                          
10 The sum of the coefficients on SEO and SEO x HIEM is 0.062 (0.018 + 0.044), and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level (p-value of the F-test for the significance of the sum is 0.000). 
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consistent with the predictions of Ross (1977).  When the bad news about the lower earnings is 
revealed subsequent to the SEO, the market reacts adversely and a stock price crash ensues.  
b. Impact of the Information Environment 
A firm’s information environment should affect managers’ ability to manipulate earnings.  
Managers in more opaque firms may find it easier to hide or delay the reporting of bad news, 
which can result in higher subsequent crash risk for such firms (Jin and Myers, 2006).  Per 
Hypothesis 1b, we expect that the increase in crash risk following an SEO should be more 
pronounced for firms with poor information environments that engage in earnings management.  
To test this hypothesis, we use various proxies of information asymmetry to classify firms.  First, 
following the literature (Armstrong et al., 2010; DeFond et al., 2015), we construct an index of 
information quality that is based on variables that are associated with lower information 
asymmetry and better information quality (see e.g. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995), Derrien 
and Kecskés (2013), Armstrong et al. (2010), DeFond et al. (2015)).  Specifically, our measure, 
INFORMATION, is the first principal component derived from the following variables: 1) 
Analyst coverage – the number of analysts covering a firm; 2) ADR – an indicator variable that is 
equal to one if a firm is cross-listed in a US exchange and 0 otherwise; 3) Exchanges – the 
number of exchanges in which a firm is listed; 4) Index Constituent – an indicator variable that 
equals one if a firm is included in any stock market index and zero otherwise; 5) Foreign sales – 
the two-year average of foreign-sales to total sales, and 6) Size – the log of the market value of 
equity.  We multiply the factor scores by -1 such that our measure, INFORMATION, is 
decreasing in information quality.   
Our second proxy for information asymmetry is the dispersion in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (DISPERSION) - the standard deviation of current fiscal year earnings forecasts scaled 
by the absolute value of the actual earnings per share.  Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts 
is a well-known measure of uncertainty or disagreement among market participants (see e.g. 
Diether, Malloy, Scherbina (2002), Zhang (2006)).  Higher dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is a 
signal of divergent views about firms’ future prospects; managers in such firms may find it easier 
to hide bad news.  Finally, we use a measure based on the proportion of intangible assets- 
(INTANGIBLES) – intangible assets-to-assets, given that intangible assets are positively 
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correlated with information asymmetry (e.g. Barth and Kaznik (1999), Barth, Kaznik, and 
McNichols (2001)).    
Using these three proxies for information asymmetry, we create indicator variables that 
capture earnings management and the quality of a firm’s information environment.  Specifically, 
we create an indicator variable, Poor Environment, that is equal to one for firms with high 
earnings management (as defined earlier) and above median information asymmetry (based on 
the three measures – INFORMATION, DISPERSION, and INTANGIBLES).  We use these 
indicator variables and run Equation 4 with the interactions. The results are reported in Panel C 
of Table 4.    
The results in Panel C of Table 4 show that firms with poor information environments 
that engage in earnings management around SEOs tend to have significantly higher subsequent 
crash risk, adding support to Hypothesis 1b.  The interaction term Poor Environment x SEO is 
positive and significant across all model specifications.  Taking the coefficients in Model (1) as 
an example, the results show no difference in crash risk between non-issuers and equity issuers 
with strong information environment (the coefficient on SEOt-1 is 0.026, but statistically 
insignificant).  In contrast, equity issuers with poor information environment have crash risk that 
is 0.079 higher than non-issuers, which corresponds to 9.6% of the standard deviation.11  Results 
are of similar magnitude when we use alternate proxies for the information environment or when 
we measure crash risk using DUVOL (Models (4)-(6)). 
Our results are consistent with the view that earnings management around an SEO are 
associated with higher crash risk.  This result is stronger for firms with a poor information 
environment that makes it easier for managers to hide bad news by manipulating earnings.  
Overall, the results so far provide support for our Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
c. Positive Earnings Surprises 
If managers manipulate earnings upward around SEOs, the likelihood of observing 
positive earnings surprises prior to the SEO should be higher for such firms.  If the upward 
manipulation of earnings by management is a mechanism driving the observed increase in crash 
                                                          
11 For the subsample in Model (1) of Panel C of Table 4, the standard deviation of NSKEW is 0.826.  The sum of the 
coefficients on SEO and SEO x Poor Environment is 0.079 (0.053 + 0.026), and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level (p-value of the F-test for the significance of the sum is 0.000). 
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risk post-issue, we expect the effect to be stronger for firms with high earnings management that 
have positive earnings surprises around the SEO.  We explore this as an alternate way to 
examine Hypothesis 1b using data from I/B/E/S to compute earnings surprises for all firms in our 
sample.  We follow the literature (e.g. Brown (2001)) and define earnings surprise as the actual 
quarterly earnings reported minus the analyst forecast closest, but prior, to the actual earnings 
announcement date.  We then compute the median earnings surprise by year for each firm (SUR).  
Using this measure of earnings surprise, we then create an indicator variable (SUR>0) that is 
equal to one for firms with high earnings management (High EM=1) and positive median 
earnings surprise in the prior year and zero otherwise.  We then run Equation 4 regressions using 
interactions with this indicator variable and present the results in Table 5.    
Results in Models (1) and (2) of Table 5 show that the higher crash risk post-issue is 
concentrated in firms that manage earnings upwards around the SEO.  The interaction term 
((SUR>0 x SEO) is positive and statistically significant.  From Model (1), we observe no 
difference in crash risk between non-issuers and equity issuers with low earnings management 
and non-positive earnings surprises.  In contrast, relative to non-issuers, crash risk for equity 
issuers that aggressively manage earnings upwards (i.e. those with above median earnings 
management and positive earnings surprises prior to the SEO) is 0.063 higher, which represents 
7.6% of the standard deviation.12  We obtain similar results using the alternate measure of crash 
risk- DUVOL (Model (2)). 
d. Managerial Private Information 
Per Ross (1977), managers with private information about a decline in future earnings are 
more likely to issue equity.  This would contribute to the higher crash risk observed for equity 
issuers post-issue.  If such behavior is driving our results, we expect that this effect will be 
stronger for firms where managers have greater private information.  We examine this hypothesis 
using a proxy for managerial private information.  Specifically, we follow Chen, Goldstein, and 
Jiang (2007) and use an alternate measure of earnings surprise based on the absolute value of 
abnormal stock returns around earnings announcement dates.  We first estimate cumulative 
abnormal returns for the three days around each of the quarterly earnings announcement dates 
using a market model estimated from days t-250 to t-20.  We then compute the average of the 
                                                          
12 The standard deviation of NSKEW for the subsample in Model (1) of Table 5 is 0.828. 
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absolute value of abnormal returns for each firm-year (ESUR) and use this as our proxy for 
managerial private information.  Specifically we use this measure to construct an indicator 
variable (Private Info.) that is equal to one for firms with high earnings management (High EM 
=1) and above median absolute earnings surprise (ESUR) and zero otherwise; we run Equation 4 
regressions using interactions with this proxy.  Unlike our measure of earnings surprise capturing 
positive earnings surprises prior to the SEO (SUR>0), this measure captures the information 
content in earnings announcements, which is a proxy for managerial private information.   
The results in Models (3) and (4) of Table 5 show that crash risk post-issue is higher for 
firms in which managers manipulate earnings and possess greater private information.  The 
interaction term (Private Info. x SEO) is positive and significant.  Taking the coefficients in 
Model (3), crash risk is 0.112 (0.082+0.030) higher for firms where managers have greater 
private information, which represents about 13.5% of the standard deviation (0.831 for this 
subsample).  The results are similar when we use DUVOL as a measure of crash risk in Model 
(4). 
V. The Impact of Securities Regulation 
Our results show that firms that issue equity experience a subsequent increase in crash 
risk.  The evidence suggests that one reason for this is that managers inflate earnings prior to the 
SEO through the use of discretionary accruals.  Securities regulations aimed at protecting 
investors by mitigating market manipulation and improving transparency and disclosure should 
discourage or make it difficult for managers to engage in earnings manipulation around an SEO.  
Per Hypothesis 2, we should observe a reduction in crash risk post-SEO after the regulations 
come into effect.  This effect should be more pronounced for firms that actively engage in 
earnings manipulation around SEOs.  
We examine this hypothesis by focusing on a recent piece of regulation enacted across 
the European Union: the Market Abuse Directive (MAD).  Empirical evidence (Christensen et al. 
2014) supports the view that MAD has been effective, at least in countries with strong 
enforcement.  We test Hypothesis 2 by estimating various specifications of the following 
regressions: 
𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (5) 
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where Crash Risk refers to our two measures- NSKEW and DUVOL- for firm i in year t; SEOi,t-1 
is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm raised equity capital in its home country in year 
t-1 and zero otherwise; Post is an indicator variable that equals one starting the year of the 
enactment of MAD in country c and 0 otherwise.  Xt-1 is a vector of controls that have been 
shown to affect crash risk.  These include: 1) DTURNt-1 – the change in the average monthly 
share turnover between year t-1 and t-2; 2) SIZEt-1 – the log of the book value of total assets; 3) 
SIGMAt-1 – the standard deviation of weekly firm-specific return in year t-1; 4) FIRMRETt-1 – the 
average weekly firm-specific return in year t-1; 5) ROAt-1- earnings before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets; 6) Leveraget-1 – long-term debt divided by total assets; 7) DISCACC – the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model, as in 
Dechow et al. (1995); 8) Market-to-Bookt-1 – the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity; and 9) lagged NSKEW (DUVOL).   
Our difference-in-differences approach (Equation 5) compares differences in crash risk 
post-issue between equity issuers and non-issuers before and after the enactment of MAD.  Our 
variable of interest is the interaction term, the coefficient β2, which captures the difference in 
crash risk post-MAD in the year following the SEO for firms that issue equity relative to the 
control group of non-equity issuers.  Per Hypothesis 2, we expect this coefficient to be negative 
and significant, suggesting a decline in post-issue crash risk for equity issuers following the 
enactment of the regulation.   
Table 6 shows results from the estimation of Equation 5.  In Models (1) and (2) we show 
results using the full sample of firms; in these regressions, our control group includes all firms in 
the country that did not issue equity.  The results in Panel A of Table 6 show strong evidence of 
a reduction in equity issuers’ crash risk post-issue subsequent to the enactment of MAD.  The 
coefficient on the interaction term [Post x SEO] is negative and statistically significant across all 
model specifications.  The reduction in crash risk post-issue is economically significant.  Taking 
the coefficients in Model (1) as an example, the results show that prior to the enactment of 
MAD, firms that issue equity have a 0.087 higher crash risk in the subsequent year, relative to 
firms that did not issue equity, which represents about 9.9% of the standard deviation.  In 
contrast, there is no significant difference in crash risk between equity issuers and non-issuers 
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after the enactment of MAD (0.021 and statistically insignificant).13  Results are similar when we 
use our alternate measure of crash risk in Model (2).  
The results in Models (1) and (2) of Panel A of Table 6 may be explained by differences 
in characteristics between equity issuers and non-issuers.  To address these concerns, we match 
equity issuers with a non-issuer in the same country and industry using propensity score 
matching, as discussed in the previous section.  We report results using only the subsample of 
PSM-matched firms in Models (3) and (4).  The results corroborate our earlier findings and 
document a reduction in crash risk for equity issuers relative to their PSM-matched comparable 
firm post-MAD.  As an example, the results in Model (3) show no difference in crash risk (-
0.008 and statistically insignificant) between equity issuers and non-issuers post-MAD. 
If the observed decline in crash risk subsequent to an SEO can be attributed to the 
enactment of MAD, we should observe an impact around the enactment of this directive.  To 
examine this hypothesis, we divide our sample period into subperiods using three indicators: 1) 
Pre-Event - an indicator that is set to one for the years t-2 and t-1 relative to the enactment of 
MAD and zero otherwise; Event - an indicator that is equal to one for years t and t+1, and zero 
otherwise, and Post-Event - an indicator that is set to one for years starting in t+2 and beyond, 
and zero otherwise.  Our base period is comprised of years prior to t-2.  We interact these 
variables with our indicator variable, SEO.  We present the results in Panel B of Table 6.  If the 
reduction in crash risk is driven by the enactment of MAD, we expect to observe no difference in 
crash risk between equity issuers and non-issuers around the enactment of the reform.  In Model 
(1) we observe that in the pre-MAD period, equity issuers have higher crash risk in the 
subsequent year (the coefficient on Pre-Event x SEO is positive and statistically significant).  
This difference in crash risk becomes insignificant during our event period.  In addition, the 
impact of MAD on crash risk following SEOs appears to be long-lasting; there is no statistically 
significant difference in crash risk between equity issuers and non-issuers in the post period (the 
coefficient on Post-Event x SEO is actually negative, but not significant).  A similar pattern is 
observed when we use our alternate proxy for crash risk- DUVOL (Model (2)).  The results are 
thus consistent with the view that the decline in crash risk subsequent to an SEO starts around 
the enactment of MAD. 
                                                          
13 In the post-MAD period, NSKEW for equity issuers is only 0.021 [-0.066+0.087] higher than for non-issuers, and 
this difference is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.267). 
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The results thus far suggest that the enactment of MAD is associated with a reduction in 
crash risk post-SEO in support of our Hypothesis 2.  These findings are in line with the view that 
the ability of managers to hide bad news around SEOs is curtailed by the enactment of this 
directive.  One alternative explanation for our results is that concurrent events in the country, and 
in particular, the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), may 
be driving our findings.  For many of our countries, the year of the enactment of MAD is the 
same as that of the mandatory adoption of IFRS - 2005.  To disentangle the effects of MAD from 
those of IFRS adoption and to more precisely pin down the impact of MAD when it came into 
force, we run our regressions using quarterly data to take advantage of differences in the dates in 
which MAD came into force across our countries.  While IFRS adoption became effective as of 
December, 2005, MAD came into force at different points in time throughout the year (see Table 
1).   
Using quarterly data, we identify the first quarter in which the MAD directive came into 
force; our variable Post is set to one starting the quarter in which MAD came into force in the 
country and zero otherwise.  In these quarterly regressions, we identify equity issuers as those 
issuing equity in the prior quarter, and we measure crash risk using data for the four quarters 
subsequent to the SEO.  Another advantage of this quarterly analysis is that it allows us to 
capture changes in crash risk that occur closer to the issuance of an SEO.  For example, in the 
annual regressions, crash risk for a firm that issues equity in January of year t is measured using 
data from year t+1.  In this case, if the increase in crash risk subsequent to the SEO occurs 
within the first 11 months, our annual measure would not capture it.  In quarterly regressions, we 
are able to capture changes in crash risk starting in the quarter subsequent to the SEO.   
We present results from estimations of Equation 5 using quarterly data in Panel C of 
Table 6.  The results corroborate our earlier findings and document significant reductions in 
crash risk subsequent to an SEO after the enactment of MAD.  Results in Model (1) show that 
equity issuers have higher crash risk (NSKEW) prior to the enactment of MAD, but this is 
significantly reduced subsequent to its implementation; the difference in crash risk between 
equity issuers and non-issuers is no longer significant after the enactment of MAD.  The results 
are similar when we use our alternate measure of crash risk, DUVOL (Model (2)). 
a. The Impact of MAD Conditional on Earnings Management  
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The reduction in crash risk post-issue observed after the enactment of MAD should be 
more pronounced for firms that engage in earnings manipulation to inflate earnings around the 
SEO.  The implementation of this directive should discourage or mitigate such behavior by 
improving transparency and making it more difficult for managers to hide bad news from the 
market.  We test this hypothesis by estimating Equation 5 separately for firms with high (low) 
earnings management around the SEO using our proxy for high earnings management, High EM.    
We report results from these regressions in Panel A of Table 7, using our proxy for high 
earnings management based on total discretionary accruals (High EM Total).  Results 
(untabulated) are similar when using the indicator based on discretionary current accruals.  The 
results show significant reductions in post-issue crash risk following the enactment of MAD for 
equity issuers with high earnings management around the SEO.  From the coefficients in Model 
(1), we observe that crash risk is 0.117 higher before the enactment of MAD for equity issuers 
with high earnings management relative to non-equity issuers.  After the enactment of MAD, 
there is no difference in crash risk between equity issuers and non-issuers (the sum of the 
coefficients on Post x SEO + SEO is -0.014 and is insignificant).  In contrast, there is no change 
in crash risk post-MAD for firms that do not actively engage in earnings management around 
SEOs (Model (2)).  The coefficient on the interaction term (0.014) is insignificant.  Results are 
similar when we use our alternate measure of crash risk in Models (3) and (4).  These results add 
support to Hypothesis 2 and suggest that one way through which the enactment of MAD affects 
crash risk for equity issuers is by curtailing earnings management around SEOs. 
b. The Impact of MAD and Institutional Quality  
The impact of regulations can vary widely across countries although it is unclear whether 
firms in countries with better institutional quality stand to gain the most from their enactment.  
On the one hand, as argued by Djankov et al. (2003), the impact of regulations could be more 
beneficial in countries with already established mechanisms to enforce the new regulations.  
Consistent with this view, Christensen et al. (2014) show that the capital market effects of MAD 
are stronger in countries with better ex-ante institutional quality and enforcement.  On the other 
hand, firms in weaker countries may benefit more from regulations aimed to improve the 
information environment and discourage market manipulation by insiders. 
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Given these opposing views on the role of institutional quality on the impact of 
regulation, we next examine how institutional quality and enforcement affect our results.  To do 
so, we use two proxies for institutional quality and enforcement: 1) the rule of law index from 
Kaufmann et al. (2009) and 2) the public enforcement index from La Porta et al. (2006).  Using 
these variables we create indicators of high institutional quality (High IQ) that equal one if the 
rule of law (public enforcement) index is above the median and zero otherwise.  We use the rule 
of law index as of 2004 to group countries, given that we want to have an ex-ante measure of 
institutional quality.  Using these indicators, we estimate Equation 5 including a triple interaction 
term (Post x SEO x High IQ) that captures the impact on crash risk for equity issuers post-MAD 
between countries with high and low institutional quality (enforcement).  We report the results 
from these regressions in Panel B of Table 7. 
The results in Panel B of Table 7 show that the decline in crash risk for equity issuers 
associated with the implementation of MAD is stronger in countries with high institutional 
quality.  The coefficient on the triple interaction term, (Post x SEO x High IQ) is negative and 
significant across all model specifications.  The results in Panel B also show some evidence that 
equity issuers in countries with poor ex-ante institutional quality also experience a decline in 
crash risk after the enactment of MAD.  Taking the coefficients in Model (1) as an example, for 
firms in countries with poor institutional quality, crash risk was 0.079 higher for equity issuers 
relative to non-issuers prior to the enactment of MAD; the difference in crash risk (0.03) is not 
significant post-MAD.  The impact is stronger for firms in countries with high institutional 
quality, where crash risk for equity issuers is 0.127 (or 14.4% of its standard deviation) higher 
before MAD, but the difference is insignificant (-0.01) post-MAD.14  The results in Model (2) 
show similar results using our alternate measure of crash risk.  In Models (3) and (4) we present 
results using the measure of public enforcement.  In line with our prior findings, we observe a 
significant decline in post-issue crash risk following the enactment of MAD, and this effect 
appears stronger for firms in countries with better enforcement.  These findings add support to 
those in Christensen et al. (2014) and underscore the importance of institutional quality in the 
successful implementation of regulations. 
                                                          
14 The p-value for the F-test of significance of the sum of the coefficients [Post x SEO x High IQ + SEO x High IQ 
+ Post x SEO + SEO] is 0.707. 
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If the enactment of MAD affects the ability to hide bad news around SEOs, this impact 
should be stronger for firms that actively engage in earnings management around SEOs.  From 
our earlier results, this reduction should be stronger for firms in countries with strong 
institutional quality and enforcement.  To explore this hypothesis, we run regressions separately 
for firms with high (low) earnings management, and include interactions with our main proxy for 
institutional quality – rule of law.15  We report results from these regressions in Panel C of Table 
7.   
The results in Panel C of Table 7 support the view that the impact of MAD is stronger in 
countries with strong institutional quality; more importantly, this effect is more pronounced for 
firms that actively engage in earnings management around the SEO.  The coefficient on the triple 
interaction term (Post x SEO x High IQ) is negative and significant in all regressions using the 
subsample of firms with high earnings management, but insignificant in regressions for firms 
with low earnings management.  What these results suggest is that the implementation of MAD 
discouraged or mitigated the use of earnings management around SEOs to inflate earnings and 
this effect was stronger in countries with strong institutional quality.  Equity issuers that actively 
engaged in such practices in countries with high institutional quality had significantly higher 
crash risk prior to the implementation of MAD, but this difference in crash risk disappeared after 
the implementation of MAD.  Taking the coefficients in Model (1) as an example, prior to the 
implementation of MAD, High EM equity issuers in countries with strong institutional quality 
had significantly higher crash risk (0.216 or 24.7% of its standard deviation) than non-issuers.  
Post-MAD, crash risk for High EM equity issuers is not statistically significant (-0.018).  The 
effect is weaker in countries with poor institutional quality, in which High EM equity issuers had 
significantly higher crash risk (0.117 or 13.4% of its standard deviation) than non-issuers pre-
MAD; the difference in crash risk for High EM equity issuers in countries with poor institutional 
quality is smaller, but still statistically significant (0.067, or 7.6% of its standard deviation) post-
MAD.16  The results are similar when alternate measures of crash risk and institutional quality 
are used. 
                                                          
15 In unreported results, we use the public enforcement index and obtain similar results. 
16 From Model (1) in Panel C of Table 7, NSKEW for High EM equity issuers in countries with poor institutional 
quality post-MAD is the sum of [SEO + Post x SEO] = 0.117+-0.050=0.067 (p-value of F-test is 0.000), which 
represents 7.6% of its standard deviation (0.876).  For High EM equity issuers in strong institutional quality 
countries, NSKEW post-MAD = [0.117+0.099+-0.05+-0.184] = -0.018 (p-value of F-test is 0.590). 
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These results underscore the importance of enforcement.  The implementation of MAD 
appears to be effective in curtailing managers’ ability to inflate earnings prior to the issuance of 
equity particularly in countries with strong ex-ante enforcement and institutional quality.  Equity 
issuers engaging in high earnings management (High EM) around SEOs, which are associated 
with subsequent increases in crash risk prior to MAD, experience a significant reduction in crash 
risk post-MAD, primarily in countries with strong institutional quality.  High EM equity issuers 
continue to experience higher crash risk (albeit of smaller magnitude) after the implementation 
of MAD in countries with poor institutional quality. 
VI. Additional Robustness Tests 
We perform a variety of tests to examine the robustness of our results.  Specifically, we 
perform several robustness tests for our main results exploring the link between earnings 
management and crash risk post-issue (corresponding to those in Panel B of Table 4) as well as 
the results examining the impact of MAD (the main results in Panel A of Table 6).  In Table 8 
we show results from various robustness tests associated with the link between earnings 
management and crash risk (Panel A) and associated with the impact of MAD (Panel B). 
In Model (1) of Panel A of Table 8, we report results from regressions including 
additional control variables; specifically, we include controls for underwriter reputation and 
analyst coverage.  These controls are not included in our main regressions because they constrain 
our sample size due to data availability.  Following Megginson and Weiss (1991), our proxy for 
underwriter reputation (Top 10 UW) is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the lead 
underwriter for the SEO ranks in the top 10 in terms of market share of underwritten public 
equity offerings in the previous year, and zero otherwise.  We measure analyst coverage (Analyst 
Coverage) as the log of one plus the number of analysts covering a firm during the fiscal year.  
Adding these additional controls, while reducing our sample size, does not alter our results.  In 
Model (2) of Panel A of Table 8, we report results after excluding firms from the UK, which 
make up about 30% of our sample (see Table 1).  Our results are robust to the exclusion of UK 
firms.  In Model (3), we show results after excluding the six countries for which we could not 
identify any equity issuers meeting our criteria during our sample period: Cyprus, Estonia, 
Latvia, Malta, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.  We include firms from these countries in our 
main regressions because they serve as controls, given that these countries also adopted MAD.  
26 
 
Excluding firms from these countries does not affect our results: equity issuers with high 
earnings management still exhibit higher crash risk post-issue.  
One alternative explanation for our results is that they are driven by other events around 
the SEO.  In Model (4) of Panel A of Table 8, we explore this alternative explanation by 
examining whether our results are robust to the exclusion of firms engaged in a merger and 
acquisition (M&A) around the time of the SEO.  Specifically, we run our regressions excluding 
equity issuers involved in an M&A in the same year as (or the year after) the SEO to examine 
whether our results are driven by this alternate event.  To this end, we collect information on all 
M&As during our sample period from the SDC New Issues database to identify firms in our 
sample that were acquirers or targets in an M&A in a given year.  After excluding equity issuers 
involved in M&As, our results continue to hold and show a significant increase in crash risk 
post-issue.  In Model (5) of Panel A of Table 8, we report results using the total proceeds raised 
in the offering (scaled by total assets) instead of the indicator variable, SEO.  All of our results 
continue to hold and corroborate our earlier findings.   
Another plausible explanation for our results is that firms that issue seasoned equity 
experience a change in the distribution of returns.  If so, such firms are just as likely to 
experience a significant increase in the probability of observing a stock price jump in the 
following year.  To examine this alternative, we construct a measure of the likelihood of a stock 
price jump.  Specifically, we construct an indicator variable, JUMP, that is equal to one if a firm 
experiences one or more firm-specific returns that fall in the top 0.1% of the distribution of 
weekly firm-specific returns in its country in a given fiscal year and zero otherwise.  We use this 
measure as a dependent variable in probit regressions in Model (6) of Panel A of Table 8.  As the 
results show, firms that issue equity are not more likely to experience a jump in the subsequent 
year than non-issuers.    
In Panel B of Table 8 we present results from robustness tests of the impact of MAD on 
the relation between crash risk and earnings management around SEOs.  As in Panel A, we show 
results using additional control variables (Model 1); excluding the UK (Model 2); excluding 
countries in which we could not identify equity issuers during our sample period (Model 3); 
excluding firms engaged in M&A deals (Model 4).  Finally, in Model (5), we show results using 
interactions with total proceeds, instead of the indicator variable, SEO.  All results corroborate 
27 
 
our earlier findings.  The results show that the enactment of MAD is associated with a significant 
decline in crash risk post-issue for firms that actively engage in earnings manipulation.  This 
suggests that the enactment of MAD discourages or mitigates managers’ ability to hide bad news 
or to inflate earnings around SEOs. 
VII. Conclusion 
We examine the link between equity issuances (SEOs) and subsequent crash risk for a 
sample of firms in 29 EU countries that adopt the Market Abuse Directive (MAD).  We test the 
predictions of the model by Ross (1977) that suggests that managers have an incentive to issue 
equity when they have private information about a subsequent decline in earnings.  Managers 
have strong incentives to hide such bad news prior to an SEO, which could increase the 
likelihood of stock price crashes, when the bad news about earnings are made public (Jin and 
Myers; 2006; Hutton, et al., 2009).  We conjecture that firms that engage in aggressive 
manipulation strategies to inflate earnings around an SEO should experience an increase in the 
probability of stock price crashes.  Further, we posit that the increase in crash risk post-SEO 
should be stronger for firms with poor information environments where managers may find it 
easier to engage in such behavior.    
In addition to exploring the link between earnings management around SEOs and crash 
risk in an international setting, we further examine how the enactment of securities regulation 
aimed to improve disclosure and mitigate market manipulation (MAD) affects firms’ ability to 
manage earnings around SEOs and in turn, firms’ crash risk post-SEO.   
We test our hypotheses by employing a difference-in-differences methodology using a 
sample of 6,735 firms from 29 EU countries that enact the MAD Directive.  We find a 
significant increase in crash risk following SEOs for our sample of equity issuers relative to 
various control groups of non-issuers, adding support to the findings in Boehme et al. (2014).  
More importantly, we are the first to provide evidence that earnings manipulation around SEOs 
is a key mechanism driving the observed increase in crash risk post-SEO, which adds support to 
the predictions of Ross (1977).  The increase in crash risk is stronger for firms with a poor 
information environment.  Corroborating our main results, we document that crash risk is higher 
for equity issuers with positive earnings surprises prior to the SEO, which suggests increased 
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crash risk in firms that inflate earnings around the SEO.  In addition, we find stronger effects on 
crash risk post-issue for equity issuers where managers have greater private information. 
Finally, we document a significant decline in crash risk post-issue after the enactment of 
MAD in the EU.  Our evidence suggests that this regulation helps to mitigate the information 
asymmetry problems associated with SEOs and to curtail the use of earnings management to 
inflate earnings around SEOs, which is associated with an increased likelihood of stock price 
crashes subsequent to SEOs.  Importantly, we find that the effects of MAD are stronger in 
countries with strong institutional quality and enforcement, which underscores the importance of 
enforcement when implementing securities regulation. 
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Appendix A – Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
ANALYST The inverse of the number of sell-side analysts issuing one-year ahead forecasts. 
Specifically, we compute analyst as 1/(1+ number of analysts). Source: I/B/E/S. 
DCA Discretionary current accruals estimated following Teoh et al. (1998). 
Specifically, we first estimate the following regressions using the subsample, j, of 
all firms in the same country and same two-digit SIC code as the equity issuer:  
CA𝑖,𝑡  
TA𝑖,𝑡−1
 = α𝑗  
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 +  β1𝑗
∆SALES𝑖,𝑡  
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+   ε𝑖,𝑡 
where CA is current accruals (the change in noncash current assets minus the 
change in operating current liabilities); TA is total assets, ∆SALES is the change in 
sales in year t.  Nondiscretionary current accruals (NDCA) are obtained using 
estimates from the above regressions as: 
𝑁𝐷𝐶𝐴 𝑖,𝑡 = α?̂?  
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 +  β̂1𝑗
∆SALES𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 
Discretionary current accruals are: 𝐷𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− 𝑁𝐷𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡  
DISCACC The absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones 
(1991) model, as in Teoh et al. (1998).  Specifically, we first estimate the 
following regressions using the subsample, j, all firms in the same country and 
same two-digit SIC code as the equity issuer:  
TOTACC𝑖,𝑡  
TA𝑖,𝑡−1
 = α𝑗  
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 +  β1𝑗
∆SALES𝑖,𝑡  
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+  β2𝑗  
PPE𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 +  ε𝑖,𝑡 
where TOTACC is total accruals (earnings before extraordinary items less cash 
flows from operations); TA is total assets, ∆SALES is the change in sales in year t., 
and PPE is property, plant, and equipment.  Nondiscretionary total accruals 
(NDTAC) are obtained using the estimates from the above regressions as: 
NDTAC𝑖,𝑡 = α̂𝑗  
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 +  β̂1𝑗
∆SALES𝑖,𝑡  
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+  β̂2𝑗  
PPE𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
  
Discretionary accruals are: 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− 𝑁𝐷𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡  
DISPERSION Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast. The standard deviation of current fiscal 
year earnings forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the actual earnings per 
share (EPS), following Diether et al. (2002). Source: IBES. 
DTURN The annual change in the average monthly share turnover.  Monthly share 
turnover is the monthly trading volume divided by total shares outstanding during 
the month.  Source: DataStream.  
DUVOL Down-to-up volatility- the standard deviation of the below-the-mean weekly firm-
specific returns, FIRMRET, divided by the standard deviation of above-the-mean 
firm-specific return in a given year. Source: DataStream. 
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Appendix A – Variable Definitions. Continued. 
Variable Definition 
FIRMRET The natural logarithm of one plus the residual from regressions of weekly stock 
returns on the local and world market index.  To account for nonsynchronous 
trading, we include the lead and lag local (world) stock market returns in each 
regression. Source: DataStream.  
INTANGIBLES The ratio of intangible assets-to-total assets. .  Source: WorldScope. 
Leverage  Long-term debt-divided by total assets.  Source: WorldScope. 
Market-to-Book The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.  Source: 
DataStream and WorldScope. 
NSKEW The negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns, FIRMRET, over the fiscal 
year.  Source: DataStream. 
ROA Earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets.  Source: WorldScope. 
SEO$t-1 Total proceeds raised (in US$ million) in the home market in year t-1, scaled by 
total assets as of year t-2.  Source: SDC and WorldScope.  
SEOt-1 Indicator variable that equals one for firms that conducted an SEO in year t-1 and 
zero otherwise. 
SIGMA  The standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns, FIRMRET, in a year.  
Source: DataStream.  
SIZE The log of the book value of total assets (WC02999).  Source: DataStream and 
WorldScope. 
Governance index The average of all six Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009) governance 
indicators: political stability, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, control of corruption, and rule of law.  Each of the indices 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating better governance. 
GDP growth Annual growth in real GDP.  Source: World Development Indicators. 
Log GDP per capita Logarithm of real GDP (current US $) divided by the average population. Source: 
World Development Indicators. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics of Sample 
The table reports the number of firms, total number of observations, and the date of adoption of the Market Abuse 
Directive (MAD) for our sample of firms from 29 EU countries.  We exclude financial firms and utilities (SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999 and between 4900 and 4949) and firms with missing data on market value of equity or total 
assets, as well as firms with assets below $10 million and those with negative sales.  Our final sample consists of 
6,735 firms (41,215 firm-year observations) from 29 countries from 1999-2012.  A total of 1,352 firms issued equity 
in their home market during our sample period.  Data on equity issues was obtained from SDC New Issues database.   
 Sample Description  
Country # of firms 
# of firms 
with SEOs # of obs. MAD Date 
 Austria 85 19 564 January 2005 
 Belgium 131 23 967 September 2005 
 Bulgaria 124 2 416 January 2007 
 Cyprus 68 0 319 September 2005 
 Czech Republic 39 1 134 February 2006 
 Denmark 168 23 1,205 April 2005 
 Estonia 14 0 62 March 2005 
 Finland 156 34 1,354 July 2005 
 France 898 135 6,115 July 2005 
 Germany 808 130 5,713 October 2004 
 Greece 315 17 2,447 July 2005 
 Hungary 40 4 248 July  2005 
 Iceland 14 2 64 July 2005 
 Ireland 67 18 414 July 2005 
 Italy 289 29 2,004 May 2005 
 Latvia 9 0 47 July 2005 
 Lithuania 17 1 85 April 2004 
 Luxembourg 31 5 208 May 2006 
 Malta 11 0 47 April 2005 
 Netherlands 149 45 1,060 October 2005 
 Norway 265 69 1,416 September 2005 
 Poland 229 21 954 October 2005 
 Portugal 60 9 457 April 2006 
 Romania 63 1 283 January 2007 
 Slovak Republic 21 0 94 January 2005 
 Slovenia 43 0 199 August 2004 
 Spain 128 26 901 November 2005 
 Sweden 488 82 2,970 July 2005 
 United Kingdom 2,005 656 10,468 July 2005 
 TOTAL 6,735 1,352 41,215 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table shows descriptive statistics for our main variables for our sample of firms from 29 EU countries.  Stock price 
and financial data are obtained from Thomson’s DataStream and WorldScope databases, respectively.  We exclude 
financial firms and utilities (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 and between 4900 and 4949) and firms with missing 
data on market value of equity or total assets, as well as firms with assets below $10 million and those with negative 
sales.  We obtain data on proceeds raised in seasoned equity offerings, excluding IPOs, from Thomson’s SDC 
Platinum New Issues database.  Domestic issues are the fraction of shares issued in the domestic market and foreign 
issues are the fraction of shares issued in a foreign market.  We use two measures of crash risk: 1) NSKEW- the 
negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year, and 2) DUVOL-down-to-up volatility- the 
standard deviation of the below-the-mean weekly firms-specific returns divided by the standard deviation of above-
the-mean firm-specific return in a given year.  DTURN is the annual change in the average monthly share turnover; 
SIZE is the log of the book value of total assets; FIRMRET is the natural logarithm of one plus the residual from 
regressions of weekly stock returns on the local and world market index; SIGMA is the standard deviation of weekly 
firm-specific returns in a year; ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets; Leverage is long-
term debt-divided by total assets; DISCACC is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the 
modified Jones (1991) model, as in Dechow et al. (1995), and Market-to-Book is the market value of equity divided 
by the book value of equity.  The log of GDP per capita (Log GDP per Capita) and growth in real GDP (GDP 
Growth) are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  Governance Index is the average of the six 
governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2009). Panel A shows statistics for the full sample, while Panels B and 
C report statistics for the sample of equity issuers and non-issuers, respectively.  Each year, we classify equity 
issuers as those firms raising equity in year t-1.  In Panel D, we report p-values for the tests of differences in means 
(t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon rank sum tests) between issuers and non-issuers. All firm-level variables are 
winsorized at top and bottom 1% of the distribution.  All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A - Descriptive Statistics – Full Sample 
 
N Mean 25th pctl. Median 75th pctl. Std. dev. 
Firm-Level Variables:       
SEO Proceeds/Assetst-1 41,215 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.137 
NSKEW 41,215 -0.239 -0.681 -0.217 0.209 0.879 
DUVOL 41,215 -0.123 -0.369 -0.125 0.113 0.389 
DTURN 41,215 -0.009 -0.011 0.000 0.005 0.079 
SIZE 41,215 4.842 3.343 4.608 6.164 2.049 
SIGMA 41,215 0.050 0.032 0.045 0.062 0.025 
FIRMRET 41,215 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
ROA 41,215 0.014 -0.005 0.035 0.078 0.224 
Leverage 41,215 0.133 0.008 0.089 0.208 0.150 
DISCACC 41,215 0.218 0.056 0.096 0.171 0.847 
Market-to-Book 41,215 2.177 0.798 1.439 2.563 3.850 
Country-Level Variables:       
Log GDP per Capita 
 
41,215 10.415 10.215 10.518 10.659 0.429 
GDP Growth (%) 41,215 1.410 0.400 1.827 3.173 2.648 
Governance Index 41,215 1.327 1.207 1.420 1.554 0.391 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. Continued 
Panel B - Descriptive Statistics – Equity Issuers 
 
N Mean 25th pctl. Median 75th pctl. Std. dev. 
NSKEW 1,898 -0.187 -0.655 -0.192 0.278 0.860 
DUVOL 1,898 -0.099 -0.346 -0.121 0.150 0.387 
DTURN 1,898 0.002 -0.010 0.002 0.020 0.091 
SIZE 1,898 5.708 4.051 5.583 7.265 2.118 
SIGMA 1,898 0.056 0.035 0.049 0.070 0.028 
FIRMRET 1,898 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
ROA 1,898 -0.063 -0.073 0.034 0.083 0.469 
Leverage 1,898 0.149 0.008 0.106 0.241 0.159 
DISCACC 1,898 0.290 0.066 0.116 0.226 0.760 
Market-to-Book 1,898 3.488 1.337 2.265 4.079 5.567 
Panel C - Descriptive Statistics – Non-Issuers 
 
N Mean 25th pctl. Median 75th pctl. Std. dev. 
NSKEW 39,317 -0.241 -0.683 -0.219 0.206 0.880 
DUVOL 39,317 -0.124 -0.370 -0.126 0.112 0.389 
DTURN 39,317 -0.009 -0.011 -0.001 0.005 0.079 
SIZE 39,317 4.800 3.315 4.566 6.105 2.036 
SIGMA 39,317 0.050 0.032 0.044 0.062 0.025 
FIRMRET 39,317 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
ROA 39,317 0.018 -0.004 0.035 0.078 0.205 
Leverage 39,317 0.132 0.008 0.088 0.206 0.149 
DISCACC 39,317 0.215 0.056 0.096 0.169 0.851 
Market-to-Book 39,317 2.114 0.783 1.406 2.499 3.736 
Panel D – Tests of Differences (Issuers and Non-Issuers)  
 Differences in Means (p-value) Differences in Medians (p-value) 
NSKEW (0.005) (0.006) 
DUVOL (0.004) (0.004) 
DTURN (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE (0.000) (0.000) 
SIGMA (0.000) (0.000) 
FIRMRET (0.002) (0.000) 
ROA (0.004) (0.000) 
Leverage (0.005) (0.000) 
DISCACC (0.006) (0.000) 
Market-to-Book (0.007) (0.000) 
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Table 3. Correlations Matrix 
Table shows the correlation matrix for all main variables for our sample of firms from 29 EU countries.  Stock price and financial data are obtained from 
Thomson’s DataStream and WorldScope databases, respectively.  We exclude financial firms and utilities (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 and between 4900 
and 4949) and firms with missing data on market value of equity or total assets, as well as firms with assets below $10 million and those with negative sales.  We 
obtain data on proceeds raised in seasoned equity offerings, excluding IPOs, from Thomson’s SDC Platinum New Issues database.  SEOt-1 is an indicator variable 
that equals one if a firm raises equity in year t-1 and zero otherwise.  NSKEW is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year; 
DUVOL-down-to-up volatility- is the standard deviation of the below-the-mean weekly firms-specific returns divided by the standard deviation of above-the-
mean firm-specific return in a given year.  DTURN is the annual change in the average monthly share turnover; SIZE is the log of the book value of total assets; 
FIRMRET is the natural logarithm of one plus the residual from regressions of weekly stock returns on the local and world market index; SIGMA is the standard 
deviation of weekly firm-specific returns in a year; ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets; Leverage is long-term debt divided by 
total assets; DISCACC is the three-year moving average of the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model, as in 
Dechow et al. (1995), and Market-to-Book is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.  All firm-level variables are winsorized at top and 
bottom 1% of the distribution.  All variables are defined in Appendix A. * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
NSKEW (1) 1           
DUVOL (2) 0.9550* 1          
SEOt-1 (3) 0.0137* 0.0138* 1         
DTURN (4) 0.0033 0.0018 0.0256* 1        
SIZE (5) 0.0847* 0.0897* 0.1129* -0.0017 1       
SIGMA (6) -0.0459* -0.0584* 0.0546* -0.0113* -0.4121* 1      
FIRMRET (7) 0.0288* 0.0373* -0.0455* 0.0036 0.3579* -0.9433* 1     
ROA (8) 0.0134* 0.0138* -0.0952* -0.0085* 0.1874* -0.2465* 0.2394* 1    
Leverage (9) 0.0305* 0.0321* 0.0311* 0.0120* 0.1917* -0.0772* 0.0569* -0.0228* 1   
DISCACC (10) 0.0008 0.0005 0.0244* 0.0096* -0.0175* 0.0127* -0.0149* -0.0644* 0.003 1  
Market-to-Book (11) 0.0267* 0.0280* 0.0748* -0.0212* 0.1733* -0.0043 0.0019 0.0347* -0.0303* 0.0001 1 
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Table 4. SEOs and Crash Risk 
Table shows results from regressions of crash risk subsequent to SEO issues.  The dependent variable is one of two 
measures of cash risk, NSKEW - the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year, or  
DUVOL-down-to-up volatility- the standard deviation of the below-the-mean weekly firms-specific returns divided 
by the standard deviation of above-the-mean firm-specific return in a given year.  Controls include: SEOt-1 - an 
indicator variable that equals one if a firm raises equity in year t-1 and zero otherwise; DTURN, the annual change in 
the average monthly share turnover; SIZE, the log of the book value of total assets; FIRMRET, the natural logarithm 
of one plus the residual from regressions of weekly stock returns on the local and world market index; SIGMA, the 
standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns in a year; ROA, earnings before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets; Leverage, long-term debt divided by total assets; DISCACC, the three-year moving average of the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model, as in Dechow et al. 
(1995), and Market-to-Book, the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.  Country, industry and 
year fixed effects are included in all regressions.  In Models (2) and (4) of Panel A, we report results from regression 
using only a sample of PSM-matched firms that do not issue equity.  In Panel B we show results using interactions 
with indicator variables of earnings management: High EM (Total) and High EM (Current).  High EM Total 
(Current) is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm has total (current) discretionary accruals in the year prior 
to the SEO above the median in its country and zero otherwise.  In Panel C we show results using interactions with 
indicator variables of earnings management and poor information environment.  Our first proxy (INFORMATION) is 
the first principal component derived from analyst coverage, an indicator variable for cross-listed firms, the number 
of exchanges in which a firm is listed, an indicator for whether a firm is included in any stock market index, t 
proportion of foreign sales, and size.  Our other proxies are based on dispersion in analyst forecasts (DISPERSION), 
and the ratio of intangible assets-to-assets (INTANGIBLES).  Poor environment firms are those with high earnings 
management (High EM =1) and above median values of the information environment proxies. Heteroskedasticity 
robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses.  All variables are 
defined in Appendix A.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A – Baseline Regressions of SEOs and Crash Risk  
 Full sample Matched 
Firms 
Full sample Matched 
Firms Dependent Variable: NSKEW DUVOL 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SEO t-1 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.042** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.019** 
 
(4.73) (3.00) (2.24) (2.95) (3.39) (2.36) 
DTURN t-1 0.087 0.094 -0.022 0.035 0.034 -0.018 
 
(1.22) (1.04) (-0.19) (0.97) (0.76) (-0.33) 
SIZE t-1 0.031*** 0.144*** 0.011 0.013*** 0.068*** 0.004 
 
(8.61) (4.90) (1.08) (8.21) (5.74) (1.03) 
SIGMA t-1 -4.114*** -3.473*** -8.493** -2.448*** -2.102*** -4.413*** 
 
(-3.15) (-3.28) (-2.46) (-3.75) (-3.92) (-3.05) 
FIRMRET t-1 -44.725*** -22.748* -70.641* -25.962*** -15.792** -37.724** 
 
(-3.06) (-1.91) (-1.86) (-3.52) (-2.59) (-2.29) 
ROA t-1 -0.029 0.008 -0.061*** -0.017 0.006 -0.025*** 
 
(-0.88) (0.31) (-3.53) (-1.02) (0.54) (-2.81) 
Leverage t-1 0.026 -0.092* 0.033 0.011 -0.055** 0.021 
 
(0.70) (-1.87) (0.56) (0.72) (-2.45) (0.78) 
DISCACC 0.006 0.002  0.003 0.001 
 
 
(1.54) (0.32)  (1.17) (0.36) 
 Market-to-Book t-1 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.000 
 
(6.06) (8.80) (0.55) (4.80) (8.31) (0.14) 
NSKEW (DUVOL) t-1 0.035*** -0.127*** 0.080*** 0.043*** -0.119*** 0.087*** 
 (4.31) (-9.50) (6.82) (7.30) (-11.81) (5.76) 
Log GDP per Capita 0.413*** 0.267* 0.169 0.216*** 0.117* 0.092 
 (3.25) (1.95) (1.12) (3.71) (1.94) (1.19) 
GDP Growth (%) -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.018* -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.009** 
 (-4.26) (-3.80) (-2.00) (-4.53) (-4.22) (-2.14) 
Governance Index -0.105 -0.149 -0.099 -0.076** -0.094* -0.040 
 (-1.59) (-1.52) (-0.45) (-2.30) (-1.89) (-0.34) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No 
Observations 41,215 41,215 6,809 41,215 41,215 6,809 
Adjusted. R2 0.037 0.127 0.046 0.054 0.129 0.062 
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Table 4. SEOs and Crash Risk Cont’d. 
Panel B – SEOs, Crash Risk and Earnings Management 
Dependent Variable: NSKEW  DUVOL 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
High EM (Total) x SEO 0.018*** 
 
 0.011*** 
 
 
(3.13) 
 
 (3.54) 
 High EM (Current) x SEO 
 
0.069***  
 
0.026*** 
  
(3.40)  
 
(2.80) 
SEO t-1 0.044** 0.013  0.018* 0.007 
 
(2.72) (0.88)  (1.87) (0.86) 
DTURN t-1 0.088 0.088  0.035 0.035 
 
(1.24) (1.22)  (0.99) (0.98) 
SIZE t-1 0.031*** 0.031***  0.013*** 0.013*** 
 
(8.41) (8.48)  (8.05) (8.13) 
SIGMA t-1 -4.129*** -4.147***  -2.453*** -2.459*** 
 
(-3.15) (-3.18)  (-3.76) (-3.78) 
FIRMRET t-1 -45.007*** -45.091***  -26.084*** -26.104*** 
 
(-3.08) (-3.09)  (-3.53) (-3.55) 
ROA t-1 -0.026 -0.030  -0.016 -0.018 
 
(-0.81) (-0.87)  (-0.95) (-1.02) 
Leverage t-1 0.026 0.025  0.011 0.010 
 
(0.70) (0.67)  (0.73) (0.69) 
DISCACC 0.005 0.006  0.002 0.003 
 
(1.29) (1.54)  (0.93) (1.17) 
Market-to-Book t-1 0.007*** 0.007***  0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
(6.09) (6.04)  (4.83) (4.80) 
High EM (Total) -0.006 
 
 -0.002 
 
 
(-0.79) 
 
 (-0.77) 
 High EM (Current) 
 
0.002  
 
0.003 
  
(0.16)  
 
(0.57) 
NSKEW (DUVOL) t-1 0.035*** 0.035***  0.043*** 0.043*** 
 
(4.32) (4.31)  (7.35) (7.37) 
Log GDP per Capita 0.419*** 0.419***  0.219*** 0.219*** 
 
(3.28) (3.28)  (3.76) (3.76) 
GDP Growth -0.022*** -0.022***  -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 
(-4.24) (-4.23)  (-4.51) (-4.50) 
Governance Index -0.105 -0.104  -0.076** -0.076** 
 
(-1.58) (-1.57)  (-2.30) (-2.28) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 41,215 41,215  41,215 41,215 
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.037  0.054 0.054 
[High EM x SEO + SEO] 0.062*** 0.082***  0.029*** 0.033*** 
p-value 0.000 0.001  0.001 0.006 
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Table 4. SEOs and Crash Risk Cont’d. 
 Panel C – SEOs, Crash Risk and Earnings Management and Firms’ Information Environment  
Dependent Variable: NSKEW   DUVOL  
Poor Environment Proxy: INFORMATION DISPERSION INTANGIBLES  INFORMATION DISPERSION INTANGIBLES 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Poor Environment  x SEO 0.053** 0.078*** 0.066***  0.018* 0.031** 0.032** 
 
(2.50) (3.15) (3.11)  (1.84) (2.53) (2.43) 
SEO t-1 0.026 0.028* 0.030*  0.016** 0.016* 0.012 
 
(1.50) (1.90) (1.71)  (2.11) (1.88) (1.36) 
Poor Environment   0.008 0.029*** 0.048***  0.006 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 (0.77) (3.74) (3.33)  (1.07) (4.07) (2.78) 
DTURN t-1 0.102 -0.015 0.087  0.042 -0.014 0.035 
 
(1.31) (-0.23) (1.22)  (1.04) (-0.39) (0.98) 
SIZE t-1 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.030***  0.022*** 0.025*** 0.013*** 
 
(15.06) (9.28) (8.50)  (17.92) (9.68) (8.13) 
SIGMA t-1 -2.033** 0.888 -4.147***  -1.491*** -0.115 -2.460*** 
 
(-2.32) (0.96) (-3.18)  (-3.48) (-0.25) (-3.77) 
FIRMRET t-1 -14.374 24.002 -45.151***  -11.312** 5.501 -26.117*** 
 
(-1.54) (1.44) (-3.11)  (-2.31) (0.70) (-3.56) 
ROA t-1 0.079** 0.176*** -0.032  0.030* 0.077*** -0.018 
 
(2.48) (5.34) (-0.96)  (1.79) (4.40) (-1.08) 
Leverage t-1 -0.068 -0.050 0.016  -0.031 -0.027 0.007 
 
(-1.53) (-1.16) (0.43)  (-1.63) (-1.41) (0.48) 
DISCACC -0.001 -0.000 0.006  -0.002 -0.001 0.003 
 
(-0.15) (-0.03) (1.60)  (-0.79) (-0.98) (1.19) 
Market-to-Book t-1 0.010*** 0.009** 0.007***  0.005*** 0.004** 0.003*** 
 
(4.19) (2.67) (5.99)  (3.55) (2.72) (4.77) 
NSKEW(DUVOL) t-1 0.028*** 0.028** 0.035***  0.029*** 0.022** 0.043*** 
 
(6.68) (2.15) (4.28)  (5.44) (2.66) (7.30) 
Log GDP per Capita 0.306*** 0.260** 0.420***  0.157*** 0.137** 0.219*** 
 
(3.16) (2.23) (3.30)  (3.47) (2.46) (3.78) 
GDP Growth -0.009 -0.008 -0.022***  -0.005 -0.005 -0.010*** 
 
(-1.29) (-1.17) (-4.29)  (-1.36) (-1.36) (-4.55) 
Governance Index -0.031 0.020 -0.103  -0.039 -0.011 -0.075** 
 
(-0.29) (0.14) (-1.54)  (-0.72) (-0.16) (-2.26) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,158 18,432 41,215  25,158 18,432 41,215 
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.043 0.037  0.058 0.061 0.054 
[Poor Environment x 
SEO + SEO] 0.079*** 0.106*** 0.096***  0.034*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 
p-value 0.000 0.001 0.000  0.001 0.001 0.004 
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Table 5. SEOs and Crash Risk- Earnings Surprises and Managerial Private Information 
Table shows results from regressions of crash risk subsequent to SEO issues.  The dependent variable is one of two 
measures of cash risk, NSKEW - the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year, or  
DUVOL-down-to-up volatility- the standard deviation of the below-the-mean weekly firms-specific returns divided 
by the standard deviation of above-the-mean firm-specific return in a given year.  Controls include: SEOt-1 - an 
indicator variable that equals one if a firm raises equity in year t-1 and zero otherwise; DTURN, the annual change in 
the average monthly share turnover; SIZE, the log of the book value of total assets; FIRMRET, the natural logarithm 
of one plus the residual from regressions of weekly stock returns on the local and world market index; SIGMA, the 
standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns in a year; ROA, earnings before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets; Leverage, long-term debt divided by total assets; DISCACC, the three-year moving average of the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model, as in Dechow et al. 
(1995), and Market-to-Book, the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.  Country, industry and 
year fixed effects are included in all regressions.  To capture positive earnings surprise, in Models (1) and (2) we use 
an indicator variable (SUR>0) that is equal to one for firms with high earnings management (High EM=1) and 
positive median earnings surprise (actual earnings reported minus the analyst forecast closest but prior to the actual 
earnings announcement date) in the prior year and 0 otherwise.  As a proxy for managerial private information in 
Models (3) and (4) we use ESUR -the absolute value of abnormal stock returns (t-1, t+1) around earnings 
announcement dates (Chen, et al., 2007).  We use this measure to construct an indicator variable (Private Info.) that 
is equal to one for firms with high earnings management (High EM =1) and above median absolute earnings surprise 
(ESUR) and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the country level 
are shown in parentheses.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
Positive Earnings Surprises and Managerial Private Information 
Dependent Variable: NSKEW DUVOL NSKEW DUVOL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SUR>0 x SEO t-1 0.040* 0.018**   
 (1.77) (1.99)   
SUR > 0 0.018 0.006   
 (0.82) (0.62)   
Private Info. x SEO t-1   0.082** 0.031** 
   (2.50) (2.07) 
Private Info.   -0.011 -0.005 
   (-0.93) (-0.88) 
SEO t-1 0.023 0.013 0.030* 0.016* 
 (1.47) (1.64) (2.01) (1.87) 
DTURN t-1 0.069 0.028 0.094 0.027 
 
(1.00) (0.75) (1.24) (0.75) 
Size t-1 0.063*** 0.029*** 0.036*** 0.016*** 
 (24.70) (24.09) (10.98) (11.01) 
Sigma t-1 -1.183 -1.016*** -4.587** -2.754*** 
 
(-1.69) (-3.15) (-2.70) (-3.39) 
FIRMRET t-1 -13.548 -10.377** -52.868*** -31.142*** 
 
(-1.60) (-2.60) (-2.95) (-3.35) 
ROA t-1 0.102*** 0.045** 0.029 0.014 
 
(2.84) (2.68) (0.58) (0.59) 
Leverage t-1 -0.002 0.005 0.020 0.016 
 
(-0.04) (0.27) (0.45) (0.81) 
Abs. DISCACC t-1 0.005** 0.002 0.001 0.000 
 
(2.09) (0.95) (0.19) (0.18) 
Market-to-book t-1 0.005*** 0.002** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
 
(3.58) (2.47) (5.70) (5.23) 
NSKEW(DUVOL) t-1 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 
 
(3.19) (4.31) (5.98) (7.73) 
Log GDP per capita 0.237** 0.125** 0.193 0.121* 
 
(2.59) (2.72) (1.28) (1.72) 
GDP Growth -0.014* -0.007* -0.018*** -0.009*** 
 
(-1.88) (-1.98) (-3.03) (-3.40) 
Governance Index 0.009 -0.025 -0.077 -0.057** 
 (0.08) (-0.45) (-1.51) (-2.18) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,988 22,988 27,803 27,803 
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.066 0.041 0.058 
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Table 6. SEOs and Crash Risk and the Impact of Regulations  
Table shows results from regressions of crash risk subsequent to SEO issues.  The dependent variable is one of two 
measures of cash risk, NSKEW - the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year, or 
DUVOL-down-to-up volatility- the standard deviation of the below-the-mean weekly firms-specific returns divided 
by the standard deviation of above-the-mean firm-specific return in a given year.  Post is an indicator variable that is 
equal to one starting the year after the enactment of the MAD in the country and zero otherwise. SEOt-1 is an 
indicator variable that equals one if a firm raises equity in year t-1 and zero otherwise; Other controls include 
DTURN, SIZE, FIRMRET, SIGMA, ROA, Leverage, DISCACC, and Market-to-Book.  All of these variables are 
defined in Appendix A.  Country, industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions.  In Models (1) and 
(2) of Panel A we report results from our baseline regressions using all firms in our sample of countries. In Models 
(3) and (4) we report results using only a sample of PSM-matched firms that do not issue equity.  In Panel B we 
report results from event time regressions using our main measure of crash risk, NSKEW.  We interact our indicator 
variable, SEOt-1, with three event time indicator variables: 1) Pre-Event - indicator variable that is set to one for the 
years t-2 and t-1 relative to the enactment of MAD and zero otherwise; 2) Event - indicator variable that is equal to 
one for years t and t+1, and zero otherwise, and 3) Post-Event - indicator variable that is set to one for years starting 
in t+2 and beyond, and zero otherwise.  In columns 2 and 3 of Panel B we run regressions separately for firms with 
high (low) earnings management, respectively.  In Panel C we report results from regressions using quarterly data.  
In Panel C, Post is equal to one starting the quarter in which MAD was enacted and zero otherwise.  
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses.  *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A – Baseline Regressions 
 Full sample Matched 
Dependent Variable: NSKEW DUVOL NSKEW DUVOL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post x SEO t-1 -0.066*** -0.022** -0.070*** -0.027** 
 
(-3.06) (-2.13) (-2.82) (-2.24) 
Post  0.058 0.020 -0.006 -0.070** 
 
(0.98) (0.71) (-0.06) (-2.23) 
SEO t-1 0.087*** 0.035*** 0.062*** 0.027*** 
 
(6.24) (3.47) (3.10) (3.18) 
DTURN t-1 0.087 0.035 -0.021 -0.018 
 
(1.22) (0.98) (-0.18) (-0.34) 
Size t-1 0.031*** 0.013*** 0.011 0.004 
 
(8.59) (8.21) (1.04) (0.99) 
Sigma t-1 -4.125*** -2.450*** -8.528** -4.426*** 
 
(-3.16) (-3.75) (-2.45) (-3.03) 
FIRMRET t-1 -44.885*** -26.004*** -71.234* -37.917** 
 
(-3.07) (-3.52) (-1.84) (-2.26) 
ROA t-1 -0.029 -0.017 -0.063*** -0.026*** 
 
(-0.87) (-1.01) (-3.81) (-3.01) 
Leverage t-1 0.025 0.010 0.034 0.021 
 
(0.67) (0.70) (0.59) (0.81) 
DISCACC 0.006 0.003 0.000* 0.000*** 
 
(1.53) (1.16) (1.98) (4.30) 
Market-to-book t-1 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.000 
 
(6.03) (4.78) (0.52) (0.13) 
NSKEW (DUVOL) t-1 0.035*** 0.043*** 0.080*** 0.087*** 
 
(4.32) (7.28) (6.83) (5.72) 
Log GDP per capita 0.410*** 0.216*** 0.154 0.077 
 
(3.26) (3.72) (1.03) (1.03) 
GDP Growth -0.021*** -0.010*** -0.018** -0.010** 
 
(-4.03) (-4.37) (-2.14) (-2.67) 
Governance Index -0.112 -0.078** -0.083 -0.020 
 
(-1.57) (-2.23) (-0.37) (-0.17) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41,215 41,215 6,813 6,813 
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.054 0.045 0.062 
[Post  x SEO + SEO]=0 p-value 0.267 0.212 0.730 0.973 
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Table 6. SEOs and Crash Risk and the Impact of Regulations Cont’d.  
Panel B- Event Time Analysis 
Dependent Variable: NSKEW DUVOL 
 (1) (2) 
Pre-Event x SEO t-1 0.136** 0.050* 
 
(2.29) (1.86) 
Event x SEO t-1 -0.051 -0.037** 
 (-1.64) (-2.57) 
Post-Event x SEO t-1 -0.061 -0.023 
 (-1.31) (-1.12) 
Pre-Event -0.099* -0.038 
 (-1.79) (-1.58) 
Event -0.186** -0.085** 
 (-2.09) (-2.16) 
Post-Event -0.147* -0.062 
 
(-1.79) (-1.53) 
SEO t-1 0.082** 0.040*** 
 
(2.63) (2.79) 
DTURN t-1 0.086 0.035 
 
(1.21) (0.97) 
Size t-1 0.031*** 0.013*** 
 
(8.74) (8.39) 
Sigma t-1 -4.186*** -2.478*** 
 
(-3.29) (-3.86) 
FIRMRET t-1 -46.162*** -26.574*** 
 
(-3.35) (-3.77) 
ROA t-1 -0.029 -0.017 
 
(-0.88) (-1.02) 
Leverage t-1 0.024 0.010 
 
(0.68) (0.70) 
DISCACC 0.006 0.003 
 
(1.50) (1.14) 
Market-to-book t-1 0.007*** 0.003*** 
 
(6.13) (4.85) 
NSKEW (DUVOL) t-1 0.035*** 0.043*** 
 
(4.28) (7.23) 
Log GDP per capita 0.431*** 0.228*** 
 
(3.61) (4.06) 
GDP Growth -0.023*** -0.011*** 
 
(-4.96) (-5.19) 
Governance Index -0.122 -0.088** 
 
(-1.63) (-2.44) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 41,215 41,215 
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.054 
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Table 6. SEOs and Crash Risk and the Impact of Regulations Cont’d.   
Panel C – Quarterly Regressions 
Dependent Variable: NSKEW DUVOL 
 (1) (2) 
Post x SEO t-1 -0.063*** -0.027** 
 (-2.82) (-2.61) 
Post  0.004 0.000 
 
(0.31) (0.06) 
SEO t-1 0.062*** 0.030*** 
 (4.09) (3.06) 
DTURN t-1 0.119* 0.053* 
 
(1.93) (1.86) 
Size t-1 0.031*** 0.013*** 
 
(8.81) (8.48) 
Sigma t-1 -2.191** -1.530*** 
 
(-2.14) (-3.28) 
FIRMRET t-1 -24.184 -17.169** 
 
(-1.63) (-2.59) 
ROA t-1 0.029* 0.005 
 
(1.96) (0.66) 
Leverage t-1 0.008 0.003 
 
(0.34) (0.30) 
DISCACC 0.001 0.000 
 
(1.68) (1.65) 
Market-to-book t-1 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-1.36) (-1.12) 
NSKEW (DUVOL) t-1 0.186*** 0.194*** 
 
(31.27) (36.84) 
Log GDP per capita 0.419*** 0.214*** 
 (5.25) (5.72) 
GDP Growth -0.009** -0.005*** 
 (-2.58) (-3.06) 
Governance Index -0.236*** -0.129*** 
 (-3.88) (-4.33) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter-year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 165,983 165,983 
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.078 
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Table 7. The Impact of MAD Conditional on Institutional Quality and Earnings Management  
Table shows results from regressions of crash risk subsequent to SEO issues.  The dependent variable is one of two 
measures of cash risk, NSKEW - the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year, or 
DUVOL-down-to-up volatility- the standard deviation of the below-the-mean weekly firms-specific returns divided 
by the standard deviation of above-the-mean firm-specific return in a given year.  Post is an indicator variable that is 
equal to one starting the year after the enactment of the MAD in the country and zero otherwise. Controls include: 
SEOt-1 - an indicator variable that equals one if a firm raises equity in year t-1 and zero otherwise; DTURN, the 
annual change in the average monthly share turnover; SIZE, the log of the book value of total assets; FIRMRET, the 
natural logarithm of one plus the residual from regressions of weekly stock returns on the local and world market 
index; SIGMA, the standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns in a year; ROA, earnings before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets; Leverage, long-term debt divided by total assets; DISCACC, the three-year moving 
average of the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the modified Jones (1991) model, as in 
Dechow et al. (1995), and Market-to-Book, the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.  In Panel 
A we run regressions separately for firms with high (low) earnings management using the indicator, High EM 
(Total) that equals one if a firm has total discretionary accruals in the year prior to the SEO above the median in its 
country and zero otherwise.  In Panel B, we include interactions with proxies for institutional quality (IQ): Rule of 
Law from Kaufmann et al. (2009) and Public Enforcement from La Porta, et al. (2006).  Countries with High IQ are 
those with above median values of rule of law (public enforcement). In Panel C, we run regressions separately for 
High (Low) EM firms including interactions with our proxies for institutional quality.  Heteroskedasticity robust t-
statistics with standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses.  The last row of Panel A 
reports the p-value from 2 tests of the difference in the interaction term (Post x SEO) between columns (a) and (b).  
All variables are defined in Appendix A.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A – Impact of MAD  
Dependent Variable: NSKEW NSKEW DUVOL DUVOL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 High EM (a) Low EM (b) High EM (a) Low EM (b) 
Post x SEO t-1 -0.131*** 0.014 -0.054*** 0.018 
 (-5.00) (0.50) (-4.91) (1.18) 
Post  0.049 0.066 0.014 0.026 
 
(0.79) (0.90) (0.48) (0.77) 
SEO t-1 0.117*** 0.053** 0.050*** 0.016 
 (7.30) (2.36) (5.07) (1.07) 
DTURN t-1 0.134 0.023 0.059 0.003 
 
(1.66) (0.23) (1.58) (0.06) 
Size t-1 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 
 
(5.55) (8.89) (5.29) (9.12) 
Sigma t-1 -4.190*** -3.889*** -2.470*** -2.353*** 
 
(-2.90) (-2.91) (-3.25) (-3.76) 
FIRMRET t-1 -45.225*** -43.502** -26.042*** -25.582*** 
 
(-2.82) (-2.62) (-3.11) (-3.22) 
ROA t-1 -0.042 0.051 -0.022 0.013 
 
(-1.48) (1.00) (-1.49) (0.53) 
Leverage t-1 0.052 -0.001 0.022 -0.001 
 
(0.82) (-0.04) (0.87) (-0.09) 
DISCACC 0.009** -0.012** 0.004* -0.006*** 
 
(2.25) (-2.75) (1.75) (-3.37) 
Market-to-book t-1 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 
 
(3.95) (5.12) (3.62) (4.04) 
NSKEW (DUVOL )t-1 0.040*** 0.029** 0.049*** 0.037*** 
 
(4.35) (2.73) (5.75) (4.13) 
Log GDP per capita 0.483*** 0.356** 0.242*** 0.200*** 
 (3.95) (2.48) (4.46) (2.92) 
GDP Growth -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 (-3.56) (-3.32) (-3.46) (-4.05) 
Governance Index -0.043 -0.175** -0.033 -0.122*** 
 (-0.46) (-2.22) (-0.66) (-3.32) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,593 20,622 20,593 20,622 
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.036 0.055 0.053 
2 test p-value[Post x SEO]a=b 0.000 0.000 
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Table 7. The Impact of MAD Cont’d. 
Panel B – Impact of Institutional Quality  
Dependent Variable: NSKEW DUVOL NSKEW DUVOL 
Proxy for Institutional Quality (IQ) Rule of Law Public Enforcement 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post x SEO t-1 x High IQ -0.088** -0.068*** -0.124*** -0.048*** 
 (-2.02) (-3.21) (-4.51) (-3.72) 
Post x SEO t-1 -0.049 -0.009 -0.059** -0.021* 
 (-1.59) (-0.61) (-2.52) (-2.04) 
Post x High IQ -0.066* -0.031* 0.013 0.000 
 (-1.77) (-1.77) (0.59) (0.02) 
SEO t-1 x High IQ 0.048 0.045* 0.038* 0.032** 
 (0.96) (1.85) (1.89) (2.74) 
Post MAD 0.070 0.026 0.020 -0.000 
 (1.23) (0.94) (0.49) (-0.00) 
SEO t-1 0.079*** 0.027*** 0.086*** 0.033*** 
 
(7.89) (4.84) (5.83) (3.55) 
DTURN t-1 0.082 0.032 0.082 0.031 
 (1.17) (0.92) (0.98) (0.74) 
Size t-1 0.031*** 0.013*** 0.033*** 0.014*** 
 
(8.58) (8.22) (9.81) (8.91) 
Sigma t-1 -4.125*** -2.449*** -4.270** -2.713*** 
 
(-3.14) (-3.73) (-2.56) (-3.25) 
FIRMRET t-1 -45.049*** -26.068*** -46.468** -29.558** 
 
(-3.10) (-3.55) (-2.28) (-2.76) 
ROA t-1 -0.029 -0.017 -0.027 -0.016 
 
(-0.87) (-1.02) (-0.75) (-0.86) 
Leverage t-1 0.022 0.009 -0.001 0.002 
 
(0.59) (0.60) (-0.04) (0.14) 
Abs. DISCACC t-1 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.002 
 
(1.53) (1.17) (1.02) (0.72) 
Market-to-book t-1 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 
 
(5.97) (4.74) (5.68) (4.46) 
NSKEW(DUVOL) t-1 0.035*** 0.043*** 0.035*** 0.044*** 
 
(4.27) (7.08) (3.76) (6.49) 
Log GDP per capita 0.470*** 0.245*** 0.354** 0.190*** 
 
(3.59) (4.01) (2.84) (3.26) 
GDP Growth -0.021*** -0.010*** -0.020** -0.010** 
 (-4.23) (-4.57) (-2.60) (-2.87) 
Governance Index -0.104 -0.075** -0.096 -0.070 
 (-1.49) (-2.12) (-1.14) (-1.58) 
     
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41,215 41,215 38,055 38,055 
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.054 0.034 0.051 
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Panel C – Institutional Quality and Earnings Management 
Dependent Variable: NSKEW DUVOL 
DUVOL Proxy for Institutional Quality (IQ) Rule of Law 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 High EM (a) Low EM (b) High EM (a) Low EM (b) 
Post x SEO t-1 x High IQ -0.184** 0.022 -0.113*** -0.018 
 (-2.57) (0.23) (-4.07) (-0.39) 
Post x SEO t-1 -0.050* -0.052 -0.007 -0.012 
 (-1.91) (-0.88) (-0.55) (-0.48) 
Post x High IQ -0.094** -0.034 -0.047** -0.012 
 (-2.29) (-0.85) (-2.56) (-0.66) 
SEO t-1 x High IQ 0.099 -0.020 0.075*** 0.009 
 (1.63) (-0.27) (2.98) (0.23) 
Post MAD 0.099 0.035 0.046 0.002 
 (1.61) (0.53) (1.56) (0.07) 
SEO t-1 0.117*** 0.046* 0.038*** 0.017 
 
(7.89) (2.00) (5.63) (1.66) 
DTURN t-1 0.041 0.116 0.016 0.046 
 (0.55) (1.67) (0.45) (1.32) 
Size t-1 0.035*** 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 
 
(8.55) (6.59) (7.75) (6.95) 
Sigma t-1 -3.867** -4.298*** -2.298*** -2.557*** 
 
(-2.43) (-3.64) (-2.89) (-4.47) 
FIRMRET t-1 -36.703** -51.903*** -21.902** -29.439*** 
 
(-2.37) (-3.13) (-2.74) (-3.78) 
ROA t-1 -0.018 -0.035 -0.012 -0.021 
 
(-0.41) (-1.12) (-0.45) (-1.59) 
Leverage t-1 0.032 0.005 0.010 0.003 
 
(0.84) (0.13) (0.74) (0.19) 
Abs. DISCACC t-1 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.002 
 
(1.15) (0.80) (1.41) (0.50) 
Market-to-book t-1 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
(5.85) (4.38) (4.54) (3.86) 
NSKEW(DUVOL) t-1 0.024** 0.046*** 0.033*** 0.051*** 
 
(2.09) (5.63) (3.37) (9.26) 
Log GDP per capita 0.405*** 0.523*** 0.239*** 0.247*** 
 
(3.07) (3.61) (3.65) (3.81) 
GDP Growth -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (-4.26) (-3.47) (-4.67) (-3.83) 
Governance Index -0.036 -0.154** -0.050 -0.092*** 
 (-0.34) (-2.53) (-1.00) (-2.92) 
     
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,806 20,409 20,806 20,409 
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.035 0.061 0.051 
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Table 8 – Additional Robustness Tests 
Table shows results from regressions of crash risk subsequent to SEO issues.  The dependent variable is NSKEW - 
the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year.  Post is an indicator variable that is equal 
to one starting the year after the enactment of the MAD in the country and zero otherwise. Controls are the same as 
those used in Tables 4 and 6 and defined in Appendix A.  Additional controls include:  Top 10 UW- an indicator 
variable that is equal to one if the lead underwriter for the SEO ranks in the top 10 in terms of market share of 
underwritten public equity offerings in the prior year, and zero otherwise, and Analyst Coverage- the log of one plus 
the number of analysts covering a firm during the fiscal year.  In Model (2) we exclude all firms from the UK.  In 
Model (3), we exclude firms from the six countries that did not have an SEO during the period (see Table 1).  In 
Model (4) we exclude all firms involved in an M&A in the year (or year after) the SEO.  In Model (5), we show 
results using total SEO proceeds scaled by total assets, instead of the indicator variable, SEO.  We replicate results 
in Panel B, using interactions with Post.  Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the 
country level are shown in parentheses.  The last row of Panel A reports the p-value from 2 tests of the difference in 
the interaction term (Post x SEO) between columns (a) and (b).  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Panel A - SEOs, Crash Risk and Earnings Management _ Robustness Tests  
Dependent Variable:  NSKEW 
DUVOL 
JUMP 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  No UK Countries with SEOs No M&As Total Proceeds  
High EM x SEO (Total Proceeds)t-1 0.063*** 0.075** 0.076*** 0.054** 0.162*** 0.004 
 
(3.07) (2.17) (4.49) (2.63) (3.30) (0.28) 
SEO (Total Proceeds) t-1 0.004 0.024 0.012 0.011 -0.029*** 0.017 
 
(0.22) (0.74) (0.74) (0.64) (-5.75) (1.05) 
High EM 0.010 -0.008 0.004 0.002 -0.007 0.010** 
 
(0.81) (-0.78) (0.41) (0.18) (-0.98) (2.06) 
DTURN t-1 0.091 0.114 0.085 0.104 0.089 -0.106*** 
 
(1.29) (1.39) (1.17) (1.40) (1.25) (-3.64) 
SIZE t-1 0.005 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.031*** -0.041*** 
 
(1.12) (6.21) (9.33) (6.65) (8.74) (-11.56) 
SIGMA t-1 -1.748*** -2.878*** -4.138*** -4.472*** -4.066*** 10.997*** 
 
(-2.97) (-2.81) (-3.00) (-3.20) (-3.11) (11.41) 
FIRMRET t-1 -10.478 -35.201** -45.806*** -48.850*** -44.425*** 65.463*** 
 
(-1.19) (-2.52) (-2.95) (-3.28) (-3.04) (6.36) 
ROA t-1 0.051 0.045 -0.029 -0.026 -0.029 -0.116** 
 
(1.46) (1.35) (-0.83) (-0.80) (-0.93) (-2.28) 
Leverage t-1 -0.071* 0.037 0.009 0.035 0.028 0.061*** 
 
(-1.77) (0.79) (0.26) (0.90) (0.77) (3.59) 
DISCACC 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.009** 0.006 0.001 
 
(1.43) (0.73) (1.60) (2.28) (1.64) (0.18) 
Market-to-Book t-1 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.004*** 
 
(3.23) (4.85) (5.92) (5.51) (6.14) (-9.91) 
Top 10 UW 0.078** 
  
 
 
 
 
(2.25) 
  
 
 
 
Analyst Coverage t-1 0.107*** 
  
 
 
 
 
(14.44) 
  
 
 
 
NSKEW (JUMP) t-1 0.017** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 
 
(2.78) (5.15) (4.06) (4.06) (4.33) (4.37) 
Log GDP per Capita 0.332** 0.147 0.388*** 0.426*** 0.417*** -0.157* 
 
(2.76) (0.96) (3.19) (3.08) (3.29) (-2.01) 
GDP Growth -0.012* -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.021*** 0.001 
 (-1.91) (-4.75) (-3.34) (-4.67) (-4.22) (0.29) 
Governance Index 0.051 -0.100 -0.117* -0.149** -0.107 -0.007 
 (0.41) (-1.36) (-1.94) (-2.21) (-1.61) (-0.16) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,547 30,747 40,447 35,133 41,215 41,215 
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.042 0.036 0.035 0.037 0.037 
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Table 8 – Additional Robustness Tests Cont’d. 
Panel B – Impact of MAD – Robustness Tests 
Dependent Variable:  NSKEW 
DUVOL 
NSKEW 
DUVOL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  No UK Countries with SEOs No M&As Total Proceeds 
Post x High EM x SEO (Total Proceeds) t-1 -0.141*** -0.101* -0.143*** -0.134** -0.112** 
 
(-3.05) (-1.86) (-4.96) (-2.60) (-2.69) 
Post x High EM -0.014 0.016 0.007 0.004 0.025 
 
(-0.85) (0.80) (0.44) (0.17) (1.68) 
Post x SEO (Total Proceeds) 0.016 0.004 0.010 0.018 0.041 
 
(0.60) (0.06) (0.35) (0.45) (0.64) 
High EM x SEO  0.062 0.010 0.074** 0.100* -0.051 
 
(1.52) (0.16) (2.29) (1.94) (-1.20) 
High EM -0.002 -0.019 -0.010 -0.006 -0.008 
 
(-0.15) (-1.25) (-0.72) (-0.36) (-0.70) 
SEO (Total Proceeds) t-1 0.033 0.088* 0.045* 0.016 0.075*** 
 
(1.19) (1.86) (1.74) (0.56) (6.08) 
Post 0.014 0.051 0.063 0.054 0.041 
 
(0.27) (0.92) (1.04) (0.82) (0.70) 
DTURN t-1 0.093 0.114 0.086 0.105 0.090 
 
(1.32) (1.39) (1.20) (1.41) (1.25) 
SIZE t-1 0.004 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.97) (6.19) (9.25) (6.62) (8.74) 
SIGMA t-1 -1.676** -2.881*** -4.151*** -4.481*** -4.072*** 
 
(-2.71) (-2.80) (-2.99) (-3.19) (-3.14) 
FIRMRET t-1 -9.518 -35.322** -45.982*** -48.967*** -44.394*** 
 
(-1.06) (-2.53) (-2.95) (-3.28) (-3.04) 
ROA t-1 0.052 0.041 -0.028 -0.024 -0.031 
 
(1.56) (1.29) (-0.83) (-0.82) (-0.94) 
Leverage t-1 -0.069* 0.036 0.010 0.036 0.027 
 
(-1.77) (0.74) (0.28) (0.91) (0.73) 
DISCACC 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.009** 0.006 
 (1.67) (0.90) (1.67) (2.39) (1.55) 
Market-to-Book t-1 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (3.19) (4.96) (5.91) (5.46) (6.11) 
Top 10 UW 0.074**     
 (2.13)     
Analyst Coverage t-1 0.107***     
 (14.53)     
NSKEW (JUMP) t-1 0.017*** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (2.83) (5.16) (4.09) (4.07) (4.29) 
Log GDP per Capita 0.329** 0.153 0.386*** 0.424*** 0.423*** 
 (2.76) (1.01) (3.20) (3.11) (3.27) 
GDP Growth -0.012* -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.021*** 
 (-1.97) (-4.43) (-3.12) (-4.43) (-3.99) 
Governance Index 0.051 -0.104 -0.127* -0.157** -0.118 
 (0.40) (-1.34) (-1.92) (-2.12) (-1.63) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 25,547 30,747 40,447 35,133 41,215 
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.042 0.036 0.035 0.037 
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